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MONICA LEWINSKY, IMPEACHMENT, AND THE DEATH OF
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW: WHAT CONGRESS CAN
SALVAGE FROM THE WRECKAGE-A MINIMALIST VIEW
KEN GORMLEY*
In this Article, ProfessorKen Gormley undertakes a post-mortem
examination of the independent counsel law, and seeks to address the
perplexing problem that faces Congress in the wake of the statute's
demise: What, if anything, should Congress construct to replace the
controversial Watergate-era legislation?
Rather than proposing a complex new piece of legislation that
renews constitutionalproblems of the past, Professor Gormley seeks to
advance a minimalist vision. He tackles these significant questions:
What is the least that Congress can do to salvage something of value
from the independent counsel wreckage? How can a post-Clinton-era
Congress (on the heels of one of the most bitterly divided presidential
elections in American history) unite to accomplish the statute's original, noble goal of restoringpublic trust in American government,
and thus forestall future damaging scandals in the executive
branch?
After examining a host of proposals, criticisms, and warnings
offered by Democrats and Republicans alike during the contentious
Senate hearings concerning the fate of the independent counsel
law-and takingplace in the aftermath of the Clinton impeachment
trial-Professor Gormley reaches several unique conclusions. He
proposes that in the overwhelming run of cases involving alleged misconduct in the executive branch, our nation should return to the old
ad hoc method of appointingspecial prosecutors that existed prior to
Watergate. In such "tier-one" investigations, Gormley concludes that
the attorney general should personally appoint specialprosecutors as
needed. Control over such outside prosecutors should remain
squarely within the Department of Justice. A new, detailed set of
internalJustice Department regulations, Gormley argues, will add
regularity and predictability to the attorney general's conduct in this
sphere, and will eliminate public distrust of the system.
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In a tiny subset of unique cases involving the president, the vice
president, and the attorney general, however, Professor Gormley parts
company with the prevailingwisdom in Washington and academia.
In these special cases, Gormley contends that Congress should construct a fail-safe mechanism to require the appointment of a special
prosecutorvia statute, but only after an extremely high threshold has
been met. In such "tier-two" cases, Gormley argues that the attorney
general, specialprosecutor, and American public will all benefit from
having a statutory structure in place to guide such controversial
criminal investigations if handled properly. In a creative twist,
Gormley argues that all three branches of government should leave
their imprimaturon the appointment of a neutral specialprosecutor,
thus dampening partisan mistrust and eliminating the constitutional and political nightmares that consistently plagued the nowdefunct statute.
INTRODUCTION

As the author of the biography of the first Watergate Special Prosecutor,1 I was an unabashed supporter of the independent counsel
law.2 One of the tangible, concrete monuments of Watergate-era reform, the independent counsel statute was constructed in direct response to the firing of Archibald Cox by President Richard M. Nixon
during the infamous "Saturday Night Massacre." 3 Cox's job was
stripped away by Nixon in October 1973, in a last-ditch effort to save
Nixon's scandal-ridden presidency.4 Five years later, after a swarm of
congressional witnesses and exhaustive legislative deliberations,- a
special prosecutor law emerged as an integral part of the Ethics in
1. KEN GoRmLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997) (detailing the life
of Archibald Cox from his youth, through his tenure as special prosecutor in the Watergate
investigation, and to his retirement).
2. The now expired independent counsel law is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599
(1994).
3. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 7 (1977) (explaining the need for an independent counsel and reasoning that "[t] he mere existence of an authority outside the Department of
Justice and the Executive Branch... will act as a substantial deterrent to extreme situations
such as Watergate"); GoiMLuY, supra note 1, at 359-63 (describing the Nixon-ordered firing
of Archibald Cox and the shut-down of the Special Prosecution Force).
4. See GoRmLEs, supra note 1, at 338-77 (discussing the "Saturday Night Massacre," the
motives behind it, and the nation's reaction to it).
5. See Special Prosecutorand Watergate GrandJuy Legislation:Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 and
H.R 10937 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. (1973) [hereinafter Special ProsecutorHearings] (transcribing the testimony of twentyone witnesses over a six-day period regarding the creation and constitutionality of new
special prosecutor legislation); Provisionfor Special Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R 14476, H.R
11357, H.R_ 11999, H.R 8281, H.R 8039, H.R 15634, and Title I of S. 495 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter
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Government Act. 6 In October 1978, a highly optimistic President
7
Jimmy Carter signed the Act into law.
The message of the independent counsel law-an outward symbol of the vow to restore good government after Watergate-was an
appealing one. It was premised upon a simple notion: The executive
branch should not be empowered to investigate itself during crises
and scandals (like Watergate) that threaten the very soul of public
confidence in government.8 When top executive officials are the
targets of serious criminal investigations, the government should employ neutral special prosecutors to avoid actual and putative conflicts
of interest.9 Moreover, those special prosecutors should be divorced
from the attorney general and the Justice Department. 10 The attorney
general is a political appointee, whose office is inherently stained by a
conflict of interest each time he or she investigates high-ranking executive officials-especially the president.1 1 To make matters worse, so
long as the special prosecutor remains a creature of the executive
branch, he or she is forever haunted by the specter of the Saturday
Night Massacre. He or she can be abruptly terminated by the chief
executive in mid-investigation if the chain of command leads back to
the president's desk.1" The only solution: Sever the link between the
special prosecutor and his or her target.
For twenty-two years, the nation embraced the simple notion that,
in order to play it safe, special prosecutors should be kept at arm's
length from the executive branch that they were investigating. Archibald Cox, the man who was fired during the darkest days of the WaterHearings on Provisionfor Special Prosecutor] (transcribing the testimony of wimesses over a
three-day period regarding proposed special prosecutor legislation).
6. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601 (a), 92 Sta. 1824, 186773 (1978).
7. PresidentJimmy Carter, Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S.
555 Into Law, 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1854, 1854 (Oct. 26, 1978) ("Today I'm pleased to sign
into law the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which gives us added tools to ensure that
the Government is open, honest, and is free from conflicts of interest.").
8. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 5-7 (1977) (discussing why a prosecutor based in the
executive branch who reports to the attorney general, and ultimately to the president,
should not have authority to investigate executive officials).
9. See id. at 6 (explaining the need to avoid conflicts of interest within the executive
branch).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 5-7.
12. Such was the state of the law when President Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The Senate hoped that the independent counsel law would prevent similar
abuses of power within the executive branch. See id. at 7 ("Any individual who is charged
with investigating alleged criminal wrongdoing by high-level officials of the incumbent administration must have independence.").
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gate scandal, actively participated in the congressional debates that
sought to find the magical key to a workable special prosecutor
scheme. 1 3 Within weeks of his firing in October 1973, Cox testified
about the need for such legislation, telling Congress that a special
prosecutor law would solve the problem of "divided loyalty or conflict
of interest" that crippled the Justice Department during Watergate. 14
As debate spilled over into the Ford presidency, Cox again returned to
Washington as a central witness in congressional hearings, endorsing
the constitutionality of legislation that would place the special prosecutor under a panel ofjudges, 15 a concept that ultimately wove its way
into the finished independent counsel statute.1 6 The judicial branch
was a safe haven that the public generally trusted. For Cox and others
who supported such legislation, the concept of having a special prosecutor who was overseen by a three-judge panel was a simple, practical
antidote to the trauma of Watergate.
Throughout the stormy twenty-two-year life span of the independent counsel law, Archibald Cox remained a proud and unwavering
supporter of the statute.17 He was fond of quoting his former boss,
Judge Learned Hand, who spoke of the incremental steps-one step
forward, two back, another forward-necessary to advance the rule of
law in an enlightened society.1 " In Cox's mind, the enactment of the
independent counsel law after the painful experiences of Watergate
was one of those positive, almost sacred steps forward after a period of
stumbling near a dangerous precipice. 19 Even in his old age, as he
settled into retirement at his farmhouse in Maine, Cox remained a
firm supporter of the independent counsel law.2" Despite criticisms
by one party or another that certain investigations had been costly or
13. See Hearings on Provisionfor Special Prosecutor,supra note 5, at 155-70 (testimony of
Archibald Cox, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University, and former special prosecutor); Special ProsecutorHearings, supra note 5, at 294-327 (testimony of Archibald Cox, former special prosecutor).
14. Special ProsecutorHearings, supra note 5, at 295.
15. See Hearings on Provisionfor Special Prosecutor,supra note 5, at 157-58 (testimony of
Archibald Cox).
16. PuB. L. No. 95-521, § 602(a), 92 Stat. 1873 (1978) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 49 (1994)) (creating a three-judge panel responsible for appointing a special
prosecutor). For a more complete discussion of early proposals for special prosecutor legislation and the evolution of the statute, see Ken Gormley, An OriginalModel of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REv. 601, 608-26 (1998).
17. GoRMLEY, supra note 1, at 432-33.
18. Cox frequently invoked this notion of incremental advance when he described his
own faith in the American system of government. See, e.g., id at 436.
19. See id. at 431-33 (discussing Cox's unwavering support for some form of an independent counsel law even in the wake of the Iran-Contra and Whitewater investigations).
20. Id.
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overly politicized, Cox continued to view the statute with steady optimism; he perceived it as a powerful tool necessary to repair the na21
tion's shattered trust in American government.
The Monica Lewinsky scandal, however, destroyed Cox's faith in
the legislation that he had so long championed. When Cox gave up
hope in the independent counsel statute in 1998,22 it became clear
that the Watergate-era law was doomed to the legislative graveyard.
As turbulent as the existence of the special prosecutor law had
been, its sudden demise still came as a shock. Like most other law
professors, I understood that the independent counsel law had its
constitutional bumps and warts. It had been dogged by Appointments
Clause, separation-of-powers, and removal problems that had generated controversy each time Congress had renewed the statute. 2 ' Like
other law professors who had studied the subject, I knew of Justice
Scalia's widely-cited Morrison v. Olson dissent that spelled out the constitutional perils inherent in such a statutory scheme.24 I knew of the
delicate dance that the Supreme Court had performed to uphold the
law in the 1988 Morrison decision. 25 But American democracy had survived for two hundred years as a result of creative solutions to concrete problems, particularly in the murky realm where the three
branches of government had to interact with few constitutional guideposts. The independent counsel law-creating a prosecutor hitched
onto the judicial branch in an odd,jerry-built union-seemed to work
relatively smoothly. 26 Like Cox, I had become an unapologetic fan of
the statute; it was a creative legal construct that had succeeded in reversing much of the cynicism of the Watergate years. At the same
time, after twenty years in operation, it seemed evident that the independent counsel law had become loose and overbroad in application,
and was in need of a major tune-up.
21. See Archibald Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A37 (defending the Independent Counsel Act as having "at its heart an institution essential to our
constitutional government").
22. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing Cox's gradual abandonment of support for the independent counsel statute).
23. For a discussion of the Appointments Clause, separation-of-powers, and removal
issues that plagued the statute from the time of its inception, see Gormley, supra note 16, at
613-17.
24. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Gormley, supra note 16, at 635 (discussing Scalia's dissent).
25. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 633-38 (discussing in greater detail the Court's M0mison opinion).
26. See, e.g., The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (hereinafter Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act] (remarks of Senator Fred Thompson, Chairman) (noting in his opening
statement that "[a] lot of people think that the act worked just fine until recently").
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In the fall of 1997, I began work on an article proposing extensive
reforms to the independent counsel law. The piece ultimately appeared in the Michigan Law Review at the end of 1998.27 When I
turned on the computer and started that project, my proposals
seemed, if anything, too radical. At that time, of course, the country
had not yet heard the name "Monica Lewinksy." Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr appeared to be wrapping up his investigation after convicting several prominent Arkansas officials who were
close to President Clinton.2 8 There was little reported evidence that
directly linked President Bill Clinton or the First Lady to irregularities
in the Whitewater land deal. At the end of 1997, the biggest controversy surrounding the independent counsel law dealt not with Whitewater, but with Attorney General Janet Reno's refusal to appoint a
special prosecutor to investigate allegations of campaign fundraising
abuse by Vice President Al Gore and President Bill Clinton.2 9
My premise in tackling this new project was that the independent
counsel statute had drifted too far from its original purpose; it needed
to be brought back to its original, sensible moorings.3 0 The statute
was initially crafted in the post-Watergate years to deal with the rare
constitutional crisis (as in Watergate or the Teapot Dome scandal)
that arises when certain high-level executive branch officials are the
targets of serious criminal investigations."1 In most cases, I believed,
the Justice Department was perfectly capable of handling allegations
of corruption in the executive branch. The Department had done so
for two hundred years.3 2 After twenty years of application, however,
the statute had become far too easy to trigger. It authorized investigations of countless lower-level officials in a tango that was shamelessly
political.3 3 Its reach needed to be narrowed dramatically.
27. Gormley, supra note 16.
28. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHMIDT &

MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, TRUTH AT ANY COST: KEN STARR AND

(2000) (stating that by late 1997 "Starr had arrived at
the view that Clinton's conduct was lawless, his presidency a colossal moral failure. But his
multiple investigations of the Clintons were drawing to a close.").
29. For press reports on this decision, see Christopher H. Schroeder, TrustingHer Own
THE UNMAKING OF BILL CLINTON 11

Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at A31; The Attorney General'sDecision; Statement by Reno on
Why She Did Not Seek an Independent Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A32.

30. Gormley, supra note 16, at 606.
31. Hearings on Provisionfor Special Prosecutor,supra note 5, at 155-56 (testimony of Ar-

chibald Cox, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University, and former Special
Prosecutor).
32. Hearings on the Futureof the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 29 (testimony of

Hon. Griffin B. Bell, former U.S. Attorney General).
33. For example, Timothy Kraft, a campaign manager, Lyn Nofziger, a White House
aide, and Eli Segal, Americorps chief and a 1992 Clinton campaign aide, had all been
subjects of independent counsel investigations. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of
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In 1997 and early 1998, academicians and legislative staffs in Congress (both Democrats and Republicans) were also tinkering with ways
to fine-tune the law when it came up for renewal in 1999." 4 Most of
their proposals were far less drastic than the reforms I advocated.
There was a general assumption at this time that the statute would be
reauthorized. It was just a question of how extensive the adjustments
would be.
By the time the Michigan article was published in late 1998, however, all of that had changed. Few mortals in the United States (it
35
seemed) still supported any form of the independent counsel law.
What happened in the interim was the Monica Lewinsky scandal and
the impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton.
Archibald Cox's decision to repudiate the independent counsel
law, in which he believed so deeply, kept pace with the national frustration relating to the seemingly bottomless dish of scandal in Washington. During a panel discussion at Stanford Law School in October
1998 (shortly after the release of the Starr Report), Professor Cox
seemed uncomfortable and noncommital when asked by a member of
the audience what could be done to correct the statute's apparently
runaway nature. 36 A month later, I sent Cox the galleys of my Michigan article, just as the House of Representatives was gearing up for an
impeachment vote. During the course of a telephone conversation
concerning my manuscript, he became uncharacteristically subdued
and, referring to the independent counsel law, commented in connection with my draft article: "I'm starting to think we should justjunk
the damn thing, Ken." 37 By the spring of 1999, shortly after the Senate impeachment trial, Cox had publicly joined Professor Phil Hey-

the Fourth Circuit, The Independent CounselProcess: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed , 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1515, 1523-24 (1997) [hereinafter Fourth Circuit Conference] (charting independent counsel investigations from 1979-96).
34. For examples of academic symposia on the subject, see Griffin B. Bell et al., A
Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REv. 457 (1998);
Fourth Circuit Conference, supra note 33. For a discussion of preliminary activity in Congress, see Mary Ann Akers, Independent-CounselDebate Looms; Friends, Foes Alike Decry Cost,
Political Abuse, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at A4 (citing recommendations discussed for
repealing or amending the independent counsel statute); Naftali Bendavid, Independent
Counsel: Has Law 'Run Amok?' Both GOP,DemocratsAgree Reforms Needed to End PartisanAbuse,

CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1997, at I (discussing proposals being considered in Congress for
rewriting the independent counsel statute).
35. See KATJ. HARRIGER, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 94 (2000)
(explaining that by 1999 the general consensus in Congress was to let the statute expire).
36. Elaine Ray, PastIs Present as Archibald Cox, PanelDiscuss Independent Counsel (Oct. 21,
1998), in THE STANFORD REPORT, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/october 21/coxl02l.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2000).

37. Telephone Conversation with Archibald Cox (Nov. 1998).
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mann (his Harvard friend, colleague, and former deputy in the
Watergate investigation) in authoring for the New York Times an unexpected piece advocating that the independent counsel law be
scrapped entirely. 8 Cox and Heymann had defended the statute until the bitter end. But now they reluctantly concluded that the Watergate-era law should be abandoned as a failure. It should be replaced,
they believed, by a system under which special prosecutors would answer to the assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division 9 -a middle-of-the-road attempt to salvage some scrap from the
special prosecutor rubble. As Cox and Heymann explained their
painful conversion, the independent counsel statute had become
nothing more than a crass political weapon that no longer served its
once-noble purpose. Both political parties used independent counsels "as bombs to toss into the ranks of their opponents."4 ° Cox and
Heymann reluctantly concluded: "The inherent faults in the Independent Counsel Act cannot be fixed merely by tinkering with the law's
details."4 1
Kenneth Starr's decision to expand his inquiry into the Monica
Lewinsky scandal and the subsequent unleashing of bloody impeachment proceedings in the House and Senate4" will be remembered for
many things. Among other unintended consequences, however, these
events will be remembered for sounding the funeral dirge for the independent counsel law. Regardless of whether one considers this progress or defeat for good government, the divisive Lewinsky scandal
and the vicious brawl over impeachment in Congress united Democrats and Republicans in their abject disdain for the special prosecutor law that seemingly spawned this national crisis. By the conclusion
of the impeachment trial, the statute had spiraled into a dark political
abyss. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, frustrated by the vilification of his office and the increasingly evident strain between himself
and the Justice Department, took the unusual step of telling a senate
committee in April 1999 that the independent counsel law had out-

38. Archibald Cox & Philip B. Heymann, After the Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1999, at A19.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. For a discussion of the StarrReport, the consequent congressional hearings, and the
dysfunctional relationship between the independent counsel statute and the impeachment
proceedings, see Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional
Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309, 312-13 (1999).
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lived its usefulness.4" The statute had proved to be "structurally unsound, constitutionally dubious, and, in overstating the degree of
44
institutional independence, disingenuous.
The hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which were convened immediately after the impeachment trial,
provide an extraordinary glimpse of a Congress in philosophical turmoil. 45 Committee Chairman Fred Thompson, a veteran of the
Watergate hearings in the Senate, made clear his own disapproval of
the statute. 46 At the same time, Thompson permitted testimony from
a wide array of witnesses, both for and against salvaging some form of
the statute. 47 These unique hearings, held just weeks after a bitterlyfought impeachment trial, reveal a fascinating dynamic. They make
clear that scholarly commentators and political leaders of both parties-weary after a messy scandal that had spattered blood over the
faces of everyone who had waded into the imbroglio-blamed much
of the disaster on the independent counsel law. 48 Of the twenty-two
witnesses who appeared in the expansive Senate hearing room between February 24 and April 14, 1999, only a handful (one of whom
was this author) supported the continuation of the independent
counsel law, even in some radically overhauled form. 49 Distinguished
deponents, ranging from former Senate Majority Leader Howard H.

43. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 425 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel) (stating that the goals of the Independent Counsel Act are "more than the Act delivers and more than it can deliver under our
constitutional system").
44. Id.
45. See id. passim. During the hearings, witnesses recommended that Congress amend
the Independent Counsel Act, replace the Act with an alternative, allow the Act to expire,
or reauthorize the Act with little change. See infra note 47.
46. See Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 1-5 (opening
statement of Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman) (discussing the problems he perceived with
the statute).
47. See, e.g., id. at 6-9 (opening statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (suggesting the
Independent Counsel Act should be reauthorized with changes); id. at 56 (testimony of
Joseph E. diGenova, Independent Counsel, Clinton Passport File Investigation) (suggesting that Congress should "end" the Act); id.at 155 (testimony of Nathan Lewin, Miller,
Cassidy, Larroca, and Lewin) (suggesting that the Act should be reauthorized with amendments); id. at 245 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno) (stating that the Act "should
not be reauthorized').
48. See, e.g., id. at 442 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr) (stating that he believed the
Independent Counsel Act was unconstitutional); id. at 243-45 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno) (discussing why the Independent Counsel Act is "structurally flawed").
49. See, e.g., id. at 372 (testimony of Kenneth C. Gormley, Professor of Law, Duquesne
University) (stating that the Act should be salvaged with major changes); id. at 284 (testimony of John Q. Barrett, Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University, New York, New
York, and former Associate Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation) (stating that
the Act should be reenacted with improvements).
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Baker, Jr. (who had served as Vice Chairman of the Senate Watergate
Committee), to Robert Bennett (President Clinton's attorney in the
Paula Jones litigation and a one-time supporter of the law), to Attorney General Janet Reno (who had staunchly endorsed re-authorizing
the independent counsel law when she took office), branded the statute as an unqualified disaster."
Although Congress allowed the independent counsel law to sunset on June 30, 1999, gasping its last breath, a critical question remains. It is a question that few scholars or legislators had
contemplated seriously until the Lewinsky scandal blew a hole in the
statute's sails: What (if anything) should Congress construct to replace
it? Throughout the Senate hearings in the spring of 1999, even senators who had fiercely opposed the independent counsel statute for
years seemed puzzled over what should be the next appropriate legislative step after the law was actually gone. What should the nation do
the next time a scandal of the magnitude of the Lewinsky imbroglio
(or Watergate) engulfs the American system of government? Should
there be no replacement at all for the special prosecutor statute?
This Article will assume that the independent counsel law, as originally enacted in the period after Watergate, will not be resuscitated.
The question, then, that becomes critical in the aftermath of the Senate hearings that ushered the statute out of existence is: Do any of the
hodgepodge of proposals recommended to the Senate as successors to
the special prosecutor law make sense? Do any of them offer hope
that citizens' trust in government-further damaged as a result of the
Lewinsky debacle-will be repaired? One thing is certain: The Starr
investigation and the failed impeachment of President Bill Clinton reverberated with powerful aftershocks, which, in turn, directly impacted upon Congress's deliberations, sealing the coffin on the
controversial independent counsel law. But the statute's burial only
raises more pressing questions. What path should Congress now take
to salvage something productive from the wreckage?
I will examine the question from a new, unexplored angle.
Rather than seeking to construct the perfect special prosecutor statute-a path that many, including this author, have taken in the pastthis Article will attempt to take a minimalist approach: What is the
50. See id. at 28 (prepared statement of Howard H. Baker, Jr., former Senate Majority
Leader) (asserting that "if [the Independent Counsel Act is] not unconstitutional, [it has]
been proved by experience to be unwise"); id. at 145 (testimony of Robert S. Bennett,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom) (stating that the Independent Counsel Act "has
simply failed to fulfill its purpose"); id. at 243 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(stating that "the Independent Counsel Act is structurally flawed").
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least that Congress can do to salvage something productive from the
scrapped piece of legislation?
This Article will argue that Congress can create a two-tiered structure that accomplishes the basic, laudable goals of the original independent counsel statute, without producing constitutional havoc in its
wake. Under "tier one," the lion's share of criminal investigations involving the executive branch would be returned to the Justice Department, pursuant to the former ad hoc method of appointing special
prosecutors that prevailed before Congress enacted the statute in
1978. Following the lead of the recent Dole-Mitchell Report, 1 as well
as the proposal advanced by former Attorney General Griffin Bell, 2
the bulk of such investigations would be handled directly by the attorney general. She would exercise her own sound discretion, guided by
a clear set of internal Justice Department regulations.
At the same time, Congress would construct a fail-safe mechanism
to deal with a small subset of serious criminal investigations that implicate the president, vice president, or attorney general. In these rare
"tier-two" investigations, once a very high triggering threshold is met
("substantial evidence that a felony has been committed"), a statute
would mandate the appointment of a special prosecutor by the attorney general, with all three branches of government participating in
the selection process. This minimalist scheme would accomplish the
triple aims of the original special prosecutor law: assuring independence, maintaining accountability, and preserving public trust in the
process. By returning ultimate responsibility for all special prosecutor
investigations to the executive branch-in both tier-one and tier-two
investigations-the most serious constitutional pitfalls that plagued
the former statute could be erased.
In order to put flesh on the bones of this minimalist vision, it is
useful to comb through the Senate hearings that were held in the
spring of 1999. Packed into those proceedings are criticisms, defenses, and insights that provide valuable glimpses into a period of
intense political turmoil in the United States. By piecing together
many of the suggestions that were offered in the form of epithets to
the Watergate-era special prosecutor law in 1999, one can begin to
construct a minimalist vision for salvaging something productive from
the statute's smoldering wreckage.

51. ROBERT

DOLE &

GEORGE

J.

MITCHELL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND THE

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, PROJECT ON THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1999).

52. See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text (discussing Bell's proposal).
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THE SENATE HEARINGS

By the time the Senate hearings convened in front of the Committee on Governmental Affairs," members of the Senate had become uncommonly weary. The deliberations over the special
prosecutor law had been expected to commence a half-year earlier.
Once the Lewinsky scandal engulfed the Capitol, however, the House
and Senate had fallen behind on a year's worth of pressing business.
The lengthy impeachment trial had consumed the Senate throughout
January and most of February. As Senator Fred Thompson, the Committee Chairman, lamented after he inadvertently interrupted a witness on the second day of testimony: "We were pent up for a month in
impeachment investigations and not allowed to talk, and I think it is
54
bubbling up maybe a little bit."
The hearings on the independent counsel law, ironically, provided a forum for senators from both parties to continue the hand-tohand combat that had begun in the Senate hall during the bitter fight
over the impeachment of President Clinton. Racing to meet a June
30th deadline at which time the statute would automatically sunset,
the senators on the Governmental Affairs Committee missed few opportunities to take jabs at President Bill Clinton, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, Attorney General Janet Reno, and othersdepending upon their level of satisfaction (or outrage) with respect to
the impeachment vote.5 5
Thompson shot a volley in the direction of former Iran-Contra
special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh who, during the Reagan and Bush
administrations, had carried out the longest-running independent
counsel investigation in history.
Although Thompson was careful
not to become unduly aggressive in questioning the eighty-seven-yearold former judge, he stated sharply: "Suffice it to say I think that some
of the criticism that you have received is justified."5 7 Thompson drew
stark parallels between the attacks leveled against Judge Walsh in the
1980s and those leveled against Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr

53. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26.
54. Id. at 158 (remarks of Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman).
55. See, e.g., id. at 184 (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter) (commenting that Attorney
General Reno expanded Independent Counsel Starr's jurisdiction without adequate information); id. at 257 (remarks of Sen.Joseph Lieberman) (claiming that Starr was pursuing a
person instead of a crime); id. at 454 (testimony of Sen. Richard Durbin) (accusing Kenneth Starr of abusing his position as independent counsel).
56. Walsh's investigation lasted over seven years. HARRIGER, supra note 35, at 90.
57. Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 353 (remarks of
Sen. Fred Thompson).
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during the Lewinsky scandal.5 8 In both cases, he pointed out, there
had been allegations concerning leaks to the press, subpoenas served
upon relatives of suspects, failure to follow Justice Department procedures, and other criticisms concerning mishandlings of the investigations.5 9 Thompson stated forcefully: "[W] hether these allegations are
true or not, I think that the point is that all of these criticisms of investigations under the Independent Counsel Act, now contended to be
structural by the Attorney General, were raised by others [during the
Walsh investigation in Iran-Contra].'0
Attorney General Janet Reno appeared before the Committee on
March 17, 1999.61 Not surprisingly, she immediately drew a heavy barrage of criticism. Many senators (particularly, but not exclusively,
Republicans) viewed Reno as a key ingredient in the unsatisfactory
handling of the Clinton scandal.6 2 Reno, who had staunchly defended the reenactment of the independent counsel law in 1993,63
forswore her earlier position and now opposed reauthorization.'
The battle-worn Attorney General told the Committee: "I have come
to believe, after much reflection and with great reluctance, that the
Independent Counsel Act is structurally flawed and that those flaws
cannot be corrected within our constitutional framework."6" Reno
went on to charge that the statute "diffuses responsibility, divides responsibility, and fragments accountability. If I am going to get
blamed for it, I would like to be responsible for it and have the tools
to do the job."6 6
This turnabout in positions by the Attorney General produced a
roar from both Republican and Democratic members of the Committee, who viewed her (for different reasons) as an apostate. Republican Senator Susan Collins of Maine interjected: "I have to tell you that
I think you had it right back in 1993. I think wisdom, in fact, came
58. See id. at 326, 354.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 326.
61. See id. at 242-47 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
62. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (depicting the criticism of Attorney
General Reno by several senators).
63. See S. 24, The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1993: HearingBefore the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 11 (1993) (testimony of Attorney General Janet
Reno) ("I am pleased to announce that the department and the administration fully support reenactment of the Act, and we will work closely with this Committee and Congress to
pass this very important piece of legislation.").
64. See Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 243 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 247.
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early to you on this issue ... ,,67 Republican Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania, who had thrown up his hands and voted "Not Proven"
on the impeachment matter, jabbed at Reno for authorizing the expansion of Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction to encompass the Lewinsky investigation.6 8 Specter implied that Reno's action, in effect, had set
into motion the messy investigation that had wreaked havoc upon the
independent counsel law.69 Democratic Senator Robert Torricelli of
New Jersey was not far behind; he reproached the Attorney General
for failing to respond to six letters he had mailed to the Justice Department, in which he had detailed a host of alleged abuses of
prosecutorial power by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.70
The senators, however, reserved their most rambunctious welcome for the testimony of Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr himself. Starr appeared before the Committee on April 14,
1999-the final day of the hearings. 71 Starr's presence in the Dirksen
Senate Office Building seemed to unleash a monsoon of pent up emotions on both sides of the political aisle, causing the debate to be
punctuated with harsh words and unpleasant verbal volleys concerning the Lewinsky investigation. Starr surprised some senators by opening his testimony with a repudiation of the independent counsel law
under which he served. 7 2 "The statute," Starr stated, "tries to cram a
fourth branch of government into our three-branch system .... ""
The embattled Starr-who had opposed the enactment of the statute
from the time of its creation-now observed pessimistically: "There
74
was no golden age of special prosecutors."
Senator Arlen Specter replied dryly: "I am a little surprised at the
forcefulness of your denunciation of the Independent Counsel Statute ...

let me ask you about your status to continue as Independent

Counsel in light of your condemnatory language of the statute you
75
operate under."
Starr quickly replied: "Well, Congress frequently passes laws, the
wisdom of which individuals may question, but their duty as law of67. Id. at 260 (remarks of Sen. Susan M. Collins).
68. See id. at 267 (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter) (stating that "the expansion of jurisdiction for Judge Starr appeared to me to be very problemsome at the time").
69. See id at 267-68.
70. See id, at 277-78 (remarks of Sen. Robert G. Torricelli).
71. See id at 419-25, 435-73 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel); see
also id. at 425-34 (prepared statement of Kenneth W. Starr).
72. See id. at 419-25 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr) (explaining his view of the
problems with the Independent Counsel Act).
73. Id. at 425.
74. Id
75. Id at 448 (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter).
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ficers is to live up to their legal obligations. One cannot quote Mr.
Bumble in a Dickensesque fashion and then say, 'I refuse to enforce
or carry out those laws."' 7 6
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, a leading supporter of the independent counsel law and a senior member of the Committee, also
jumped into the fray.77 Levin castigated the special prosecutor for his
over-zealousness and listed a bill of particulars setting forth a host of
alleged excesses committed by Starr's office.7" "In my judgment,"
stated Senator Levin, "you have gone beyond what an average prosecutor would do in the investigation of a private citizen, and you have
failed to comply with Justice Department policies as intended under
the Independent Counsel law."79
Senator Torricelli, who had begun by complimenting Starr (generally) for his impressive career in public service, nevertheless agreed
that the special prosecutor had fallen off the saddle on the Lewinsky
investigation. Torricelli observed darkly:
You will forgive me, but I do not understand how a learned
man of good judgment allowed things to get to this state of
affairs. It is true that you were under merciless attack. But it
was not necessary to pin a target to your chest on all occasions either.8 °
Republican SenatorJudd Gregg of New Hampshire scrambled to
Starr's defense, reminding the assemblage of Starr's overall track record." The Whitewater prosecutor, Gregg noted, had convicted Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker of conspiracy and fraud in
connection with the Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan venture, and
had obtained a guilty plea from former U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Webster Hubbell in connection with fraudulent billings at the Rose
Law Firm.8 2 Gregg's defense of Starr proceeded as follows:
Senator Gregg: So I would say to you, Judge, that you did
your job.
Judge Starr: Thank you.
Senator Gregg: Yourjob was to protect the people from individuals who had violated their oaths of office, and in those
two instances and in the 14 other convictions, one presumes

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id, (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr).
See id. at 445-46 (remarks of Sen. Carl Levin).
See id
Id. at 445.
Id. at 458-59 (remarks of Sen. Robert G. Torricelli).
See id. at 456-58 (remarks of Sen. Judd Gregg).
Id. at 455-56.
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there was a serious event that required the public's rights to
be protected. So I do not think they were the victims, although we may hear that from the other side of the aisle.8"
And so the hearings proceeded. One immediate aftereffect of
the controversial Lewinsky investigation and the bitter impeachment
fight, then, was to shift the battle to a new front-namely, the re-authorization of the independent counsel law. In an ironic twist, the
grueling impeachment proceedings had left strange bedfellows in
their wake. Democratic senators who had consistently endorsed the
special prosecutor law during its twenty-two-year existence switched
positions and lobbied against reauthorization. Republican senators
who had railed against the statute for years were forced to defend a
Republican special prosecutor who had hit rock bottom in the eyes of
the American public.
Yet as the emotional hearings before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs ground forward, few senators or witnesses disagreed with the sentiment expressed by former Senate Majority
Leader Howard H. Baker,Jr., in opening the proceedings. The highly
respected Senator Baker, who had served as Vice Chairman of the
Senate Watergate Committee in 1973,84 had struck a universal chord
when he issued a call for calm judgment in the wake of the impeachment tempest: "I recommend to the Senate, to this Committee, that
we cool it and think about it for a while. We let the temper of these
times subside." 5
Even among senators with radically divergent views concerning
the most sensible approach to handling criminal investigations within
the executive branch, there was a shared understanding that finding
an answer to the independent counsel mess was like solving Rubik's
cube. No matter how one moved around the colors to solve the puzzle, it was impossible to find an easy solution. As Chairman Fred
Thompson summarized on the fourth day of the Senate hearings,
there was an inherent conflict between the desire to ensure the appointment of truly independent special prosecutors in high-profile
cases, and the equally powerful desire to ensure that special prosecutors were accountable to some branch of government so that they did
86
not wreak havoc on our tripartite system of government.

83. Id at 456 (remarks of Sen. Judd Gregg and Kenneth W. Starr).
84. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 252 (1990).
85. Hearings on the Future of the Independent CounselAct, supra note 26, at 27 (testimony of
Hon. Howard H. Baker, Jr., former Senate Majority Leader).
86. Id. at 326 (remarks of Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman).

2001]

WHAT CONGRESS CAN SALVAGE FROM THE WRECKAGE

113

As the Senate proceedings marched forward for nearly two
months, there was debate and disagreement. At times there were
sharp verbal exchanges. Yet a surprisingly thoughtful and useful discussion emerged on the pages of the Committee transcripts. As passions cooled and the hearings moved from February into late March,
it became clear that senators of both political parties had become focused on a new issue that had simply not entered their consciousness
previously. It was now a foregone conclusion that the statute would
not be reauthorized on June 30th. The new question became: What,
if anything, should Congress do to replace the doomed statute?
From the text of the Senate hearings, one can find the raw materials needed to begin this critical discussion. Picking up where the
hearings left off, it is possible to move beyond the partisan disagreements that ushered the statute out of existence, and to shift to a question that is critical for Democrats and Republicans alike: What is the
minimal legislative scheme that Congress might construct to preserve
something positive from the past twenty-three years, thus accomplishing the rudimentary goals of the original special prosecutor law? Or,
to put it another way: What is the least controversial statute that Congress could create that would assure independence and accountability
while simultaneously rebuilding public trust in the American criminal
justice system? This Article will address this fundamental question by
dissecting the various proposals that were offered for replacing the
independent counsel statute as it lay on its deathbed, and by proposing a relatively noncontroversial replacement for the Watergate-era
statute.
II.

WHAT OPTIONS SHOULD CONGRESS CONSIDER NEXT?

Most of the proposals for scrapping the independent counsel law
involved some concomitant plan for replacing the statute with a substitute. Some of the proposals envisioned serious replacements;
others suggested mere placebos. Most of these plans were restatements of the ideas of scholars and legislators who had sparred over
the fate of the independent counsel law for the previous five years in
anticipation of the law's potential reauthorization. But there is much
wisdom to be found in this hodgepodge of proposals. Assuming that
Congress has reached an internal consensus that it will not reenact
the former independent counsel statute in any recognizable form, it
must now decide which substitute approach will allow the nation to
salvage something beneficial from the messy scandal that marred the
Clinton presidency.
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This Article will conclude that the answer lies in splicing together
several of the proposals that were offered during the course of the
Senate hearings. By creating a system under which the bulk of special
prosecutor investigations are handled pursuant to the old ad hoc system, the bare minimum will be accomplished. But securing this system requires the creation of a second tier-a fail-safe mechanismunder which special cases that involve serious charges against the president, vice president, or attorney general are handled. By isolating
those cases that often spiral into crises and destroy public trust in government, this Article will suggest that Congress can accomplish the
minimum goals that inspired the creation of the special prosecutor
law without sacrificing accountability or damaging our tripartite system of government. A useful starting point in this effort to construct a
minimalist replacement for the expired independent counsel law is an
examination of a wide range of proposals advanced during the Senate
hearings of 1999.
A.

PermanentSpecial Prosecutors

By far, the worst suggestions for replacing the independent counsel law are those that involve creating some form of a permanent office. Some such proposals would create a free-standing operation;
others would create an office appended to an existing unit in the executive branch. In either case, the primary duty of this entrenched
office would be to sniff out ethical violations and criminal misconduct
by executive branch officials.8 7 Such a concept was recently advanced
in scholarly articles written by Inspector General Michael R.
Bromwich and Professor Kathleen Clark, both of whom advocated replacing or supplementing the independent counsel law with an "Inspector General""8 for the White House, who would be assigned to
keep a watchful eye for ethical violations and abuses by executive
officials.8 9
87. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 618 (stating that "the mere presence of such a 'watchdog' would presumably discourage abuses of the law in the first place").
88. The Inspector General Act of 1978 is codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-12
(1994).
89. Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model 86
GEO. L.J. 2027 (1998); Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An Inspector General

for the White House, 49 MERCER L. REv. 553 (1998). A variation of this approach, although
broader in scope, would create an Office of Public Prosecutor charged with prosecuting
alleged ethical crimes committed by all public officials, as is the case in Britain and Northern Ireland. See Bell et al., supra note 34, at 477-78 (remarks of Lloyd Cutler, former counsel to Presidents Carter and Clinton).
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An offshoot of the Inspector General proposal is a model that
would create a permanent group responsible for selecting and supervising special prosecutors. During the 1999 Senate debates, former
Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh proposed the creation of a permanent office that would be charged with appointing
special prosecutors and overseeing their operations.9" Walsh's proposed office would have been akin to the Federal Reserve Board, with
members appointed on a staggered basis, so that no one president
could appoint all members of the board.9" Each appointee would be
subject to confirmation by the Senate.9 2
Such calls for permanent special prosecutors or permanent bodies to appoint and supervise special prosecutors are nothing new. In
the 1970s, during the original congressional debates leading up to the
enactment of the special prosecutor law, the air was filled with proposals for such permanent watchdogs.9 3 Senate Bill 495, the ill-fated
Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975, was introduced by
Senator Abraham Ribicoff at the start of the 94th Congress.9 4 This bill
would have established an Office of Public Attorney that would have
operated independently of the Justice Department and the president.9 5 The office would have been charged with investigating and
prosecuting impropriety in the executive branch, as well as abuses relating to federal election laws.9 6 Selection of the special prosecutor
would have been made for a five-year renewable term by a special judicial panel.9 7
90. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 330 (testimony
of Lawrence Walsh, former Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation). In a Slate
cyberspace magazine dialogue, Professor Akhil Reed Amar also advocated the creation of a
.permanent office of independent investigation... [that] could be headed by one person
(as is the FBI) or five (the FTC)." Akhil Reed Amar & Ken Gormley, Should We Ditch the
Independent Prosecutor Law? (Feb. 18, 1999), at http://slate.msn.com/dialogues/99-02-17/
dialogues.asp?iMsg=5. A recent article by Professor Thomas W. Merrill similarly proposed
a system by which an office of career civil service prosecutors headed by a presidential
appointee would be created to oversee investigations. Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsel: Evaluating the Options, 43 ST. Louis L.J. 1047, 1063-64, 1079-81 (1999).
91. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 330 (testimony of Lawrence E. Walsh).
92. See id.
93. Advocates of such a permanent position included Samuel Dash and Lloyd Cutler.
HARRIGER,

supra note 35, at 65-66.

94. A copy of the bill that Senator Ribicoff proposed accompanies the Hearings on the
Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act. Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975:
Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. 159
(1975) [hereinafter Hearings on the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act].
95. See id. at 160-61.
96. See id. at 161.
97. See id. at 160.
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The proposal was swiftly and definitively rejected, in large part
because of its inclusion of a permanent watchdog feature. 98 Senator
Howard H. Baker, Jr., who was a central figure during the Watergate
drama, warned that such a feature would "establish a virtually inviolate
fourth branch of Government," thus erasing accountability to the
chief executive or any extant branch of government.9 9 Long-time
presidential advisor Clark Clifford noted that the creation of a permanent special prosecutor would spawn other problems as well. Clifford
predicted that "[e] xcessive zeal or possibly boredom by the Public Attorney, or a desire to avoid being tagged as a 'do-nothing', could lead
to petty prosecutions and harassment of persons in the Executive
Branch."l°°

Ultimately, the hue and cry over the permanent special prosecutor concept doomed Senate Bill 495 to the legislative graveyard.' 0 1
That bill was replaced by Senate Bill 555, which ultimately prevailed,
largely because it created a temporary office that would be used only

02
when allegations of serious wrongdoing triggered it.'

If the experiences of the divisive Lewinsky investigation and impeachment ordeal gave legislators pause about the continued efficacy
of the existing independent counsel statute, proposals involving the
creation of a permanent office should give Congress even more serious jitters. Once a temporary special prosecutor is replaced by a permanent office of watchdog prosecutors, or a "board" charged with
appointing and supervising special prosecutors, the temptation to engage in overkill becomes irresistible. Like the Maytag Repairman waiting anxiously for a washing machine to break, the watchdog
prosecutor has no raison d'etre other than to identify scandal and
stamp it out. If the past twenty-three years taught us anything about
independent counsel investigations, they taught us that as long as
there are special prosecutors available to lead the investigations, political actors of both stripes will swiftly learn how to manipulate and tilt
the machine until it generates scandal. "Less rather than more" seems
to be a useful starting point for any proposed replacement statute.
Permanent offices and watchdog boards constitute the least desirable
solution.
98. Gormley, supra note 16, at 618.
99. Hearings on the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act, supra note 94, at 23 (prepared statement of Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr.).
100. Id. at 204 (letter from Clark M. Clifford to Senators Abe Ribicoff and Charles H.
Percy).
101. For a general discussion of the demise of Senate Bill 495 and the widespread disapproval of the "permanent special prosecutor" notion, see Gormley, supra note 16, at 617-23.
102. See id. at 624-26 (discussing the evolution of Senate Bill 555).
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The Common Cause Approach

A novel proposal that made its debut in the thick of the Lewinsky
scandal was that offered by Harvard Professors Philip Heymann, Archibald Cox, and Derek Bok,'0° and later endorsed by the citizens
group Common Cause.' 0 4 The Common Cause proposal, which spun
out of a piece that Cox and Heymann wrote for the New York Times,' 05
was more fully articulated in Heymann's testimony before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs on March 17, 1999.106 The Com-

mon Cause plan, in essence, involved returning independent counsel
investigations to the Justice Department, where they could be superassistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal
vised by the
10 7
Division.
The Common Cause proposal was, in many ways, a last-minute
effort to salvage something from the smoking wreckage of the independent counsel statute. The proposal had a certain amount of intellectual appeal. Through a rather elaborate mechanism, the assistant
attorney general would handle all allegations of misconduct by highlevel executive officials, thus constructing an invisible "firewall" that
shielded him or her from the attorney general."0 ' This division would
prevent the attorney general from participating in, or interfering with,
a select category of investigations that might trigger serious conflicts. 10 9 Under the Common Cause plan, before a final decision was
made not to prosecute a handful of top executive branch officialsincluding the president, vice president, or attorney general herselfthe assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division would
be required to consult with a panel of three of his or her predecessors
in that office, one of whom would have to be a member of the opposing political party. 110 If the assistant attorney general declined to
prosecute, he or she would be required to state publicly his or her
103. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 322-24 (prepared statement of Common Cause). Common Cause is a citizens group, which at the
time was chaired by former President of Harvard University Derek Bok. Id. at 324. Archibald Cox served as Chairman Emeritus, Ann McBride served as President, and Philip Heymann was a member of the group's National Governing Board. Id.
104. Id. at 322-24.
105. Cox & Heymann, supra note 38.
106. See Hearingson the Future of the Independent CounselAct, supra note 26, at 291-94 (testimony and prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law,
Harvard University, and former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department ofJustice, and
former Associate Watergate Special Prosecutor).
107. See id. at 291.
108. Id. at 324 (prepared statement of Common Cause).

109. See id.
110. Id. at 291 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
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reasons."' 1 The members of the panel would be free to make their
views public if they disagreed with the decision not to prosecute. 1 2 In
this fashion, there would be a public airing of the deliberative process,
and Congress would be free to initiate its own hearings if it questioned
the assistant attorney general's decision."'
Under the Common Cause proposal, the separation-of-powers
problem would be largely eliminated. The attorney general and deputy attorney general-as superiors in the chain of command-would
always possess the power to overrule the decision of the assistant attor14
ney general in charge of the Criminal Division in any investigation.'
But they would be required to do so publicly, thus eliminating partisan efforts to sweep legitimate investigations under the prosecutorial
rug.' 1 5 Congress could investigate.' 1 6 The public could express out17
rage. The attorney general could be held accountable.1
The Common Cause proposal was designed to resemble the informal method of investigation that Attorneys General Griffin Bell
and Benjamin Civiletti had adopted during the Carter Administration
(when Heymann worked in the Justice Department as head of the
Criminal Division)." i The proposal was also built to resemble the
British system, which creates a director of public prosecutions who is
responsible for sensitive investigations. 19 The Common Cause approach is admirable in its simplicity. It keeps the attorney general
herself (a member of the president's cabinet) out of prosecutorial decisions involving top executive officials, thus avoiding the reality or
appearance of political monkey-business.1 20 It also maintains accountability for special prosecutor investigations within the Justice Department, 21 thus eliminating much of the separation-of-powers bugaboo
1 22
that haunted the independent counsel law from its inception.
Yet the Common Cause approach, while interesting and appealing, has a number of drawbacks. First, although it is true that the
assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division has his111. Id. at 293-94 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
112. Id. at 292 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
113. Id. at 294 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
114. Id at 323 (prepared statement of Common Cause).
115. Id.
116. Id at 294 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
117. Id
118. Id. at 293.
119. Id at 291 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
120. See id. at 293 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
121. See id. at 324 (prepared statement of Common Cause).
122. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 615-17 (discussing the separation-of-powers problems
that plagued the independent counsel law, even prior to its enactment in 1978).
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torically been far less politically linked to the president than the attorney general himself or herself,12 3 this equation would change swiftly if
it was known that the assistant attorney general was destined to head
all investigations involving executive misconduct. The assistant attorney general is a presidential appointee.1 24 The chief executive would
view this appointment through an entirely new lens if the person selected for that post might ultimately be responsible for investigating
scandal in the White House. It is true, as Common Cause contended
in its written statement to the Committee, that the Senate confirmation process would ensure that the assistant attorney general is a person "of high integrity, professionalism, impartiality and
independence," 125 but that is no less true of the Senate confirmation
of the attorney general. The fact remains that the Common Cause
approach would inevitably intensify the political skirmishing when it
came to appointing an assistant attorney general to head the Criminal
Division; it would replicate the problems that already exist with respect to attorneys general who are closely aligned with the president.
More importantly, the Common Cause approach creates a cumbersome set of hoops through which the assistant attorney general
must jump, with very little payoff. Under the Common Cause model,
the assistant attorney general would have absolute discretion to prosecute or not prosecute. 26 The only constraint on this discretion would
be that he or she would be required to consult with a wizard-like
board of three predecessors, who would be free to publicly state their
bases for disagreement if the prosecution were declined. 1 27 The assistant attorney general also would be required to publicly state his or
her reasons for declining to prosecute.' 28 The attorney general and
deputy attorney general would be free to overrule the assistant attorney general, so long as they explained their reasons publicly.' 2 9 But
in the end, the Common Cause approach would do nothing more
than swap the assistant attorney general for the attorney generalchanging the actors, but not the problems that accompany their

123. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 322-23 (prepared statement of Common Cause) (explaining why the assistant attorney general in
-charge of the Criminal Division would be more independent than the attorney general).
124. Id. at 293 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
125. Id. at 323 (prepared statement of Common Cause).
126. Id at 291-92 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 293-94 (prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann).
129. Id. at 293.
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As Attorney General Reno stated in her Senate testimony:

"The Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is appointed
by the President, and once you shift responsibility from the Attorney
General to the Assistant Attorney General, appointed by the President, we are going to be right back here, only it won't be me sitting in
this seat ....

Moreover, a new set of separation-of-powers problems rears its
head under the Common Cause model. As Attorney General Reno
explained:
If you limit the authority within the Executive Branch so that
the President or the Attorney General cannot remove a head
of the Criminal Division, then you raise constitutional questions about the President's responsibility for faithfully executing the laws. It is a difficult issue and I don't think
1 32
moving the boxes around is going to solve the problem.
The Attorney General concluded: "If I am going to get blamed for it, I
133
would like to be responsible for it and have the tools to do the job."
There is a final touch of irony about the Common Cause position, which was endorsed by Philip Heymann and Archibald Cox, both
of whom played major roles in Watergate."' If the Common Cause
model had been in effect during the Watergate scandal, it would have
shifted responsibility to the very person who had spawned conflicts
between the Justice Department and the White House-Henry Petersen. 3 5 Cox had been appointed special prosecutor precisely because
the Justice Department and the White House were exchanging information concerning the investigation.18 6 It was later revealed that the
chief cause of that informational leak was Petersen, who was head of
130. The Common Cause approach is similar to one advocated earlier by Senator Howard Baker, Jr., and others. Baker proposed bolstering the Public Integrity Section of the
Justice Department, making the head of that Section, in effect, in charge of special prosecution investigations, and subjecting that individual to Senate confirmation. See id. at 47
(remarks of Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr.). Senator Baker later questioned the wisdom of his
own proposal, contemplating whether it constituted an unwarranted intrusion upon the
authority of the attorney general and president. See i.
131. Id. at 271-72 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
132. Id. at 272.
133. Id. at 247.
134. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (accounting for Cox's and Heymann's endorsement of the Common Cause model).
135. See GORMLEY, supra note 1, at 254-56 (discussing Petersen's role in the Watergate
scandal).
136. See id. at 232 (discussing Cox's appointment as special prosecutor and explaining
that "[t]he alleged scandal had come so close to the executive branch that it seemed wise
to divorce the investigation from the Justice Department").
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the Criminal Division of the Justice Department.1 3 7 Although an honorable and decent man, Petersen was inordinately grateful to President Nixon for his appointment and was funneling information about
the investigation directly to the President.13 Thus, during Watergate,
the Common Cause model would have placed responsibility in the
hands of Petersen, who created the need for the appointment of a
special prosecutor in the first place.
The Common Cause approach has one virtue-it largely escapes
the constitutional minefields that dogged the original special prosecutor statute by reposing power in a member of the Justice Department
who is one step removed from the attorney general.13 9 In that sense,
the Common Cause model is worth considering as a fallback when the
attorney general is thrown into actual conflict situations. 4 ° Yet it is
not clear that the payoff would be sufficiently lucrative to justify constructing an entire special prosecutor mechanism around the assistant
attorney general. Vesting power directly in the attorney general so
that she remains accountable, in most instances, would be less cumbersome and more productive than building an apparatus around one
of her subordinates.
C.

Executive Branch Appointment of the Special Prosecutor

Another idea that has been kicked around since the inception of
the independent counsel law is the notion of having a roster of potential special prosecutors appointed directly by the president-in advance of any crisis-and confirmed by the Senate. Recently, this
concept has been floated by distinguished presidential advisor Lloyd
Cutler."' At a Mercer Law School roundtable session, Cutler proposed having the president nominate, and the Senate confirm, five or
ten potential independent counsels from whom a three-judge panel
could select a special prosecutor.'4 2
Once again, this "executive branch appointment" model is nothing new. In 1976, as Congress wrangled with various formulations of
137. See id. at 254-60, 368-71 (discussing the extent of Petersen's information leaks to
the White House).
138. See id. at 368-69.
139. See Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 322-24 (prepared statement of Common Cause).
140. This point will be discussed later in the Article. See infta notes 218-229 and accompanying text (discussing the appointment of an independent counsel under a "tier-two"
mechanism).
141. See Bell et al., supra note 34, at 477-78 (remarks of Lloyd N. Cutler, former counsel
to Presidents Carter and Clinton).
142. Id. at 477.
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an early special prosecutor bill, President Ford communicated his own
plan to the Senate.14 3 Pursuant to the ill-fated Senate Bill 495,144 the
special prosecutor under the Ford plan would be appointed by the
president to a three-year term, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 14 5 The special prosecutor would then remain under the control
of the attorney general, who would maintain supervisory and removal
46
power. 1
The executive branch appointment model has some strengths. It
48
47
cleanly bypasses the separation-of-powers,' Appointments Clause,'
and removal problems 149 by reposing the power to hire (and termi-

nate) special prosecutors directly in the hands of the chief executive. 15 ' The model also produces an incurable defect, however. By
placing control of the process directly in the president-even while
layering this on top of the advice and consent of the Senate-this approach brings us full circle to the Saturday Night Massacre dilemma.
Once the president's hand is placed on the control lever, so that he
can terminate a special prosecutor who "gets too close to the scent" in
a criminal case-as President Nixon did with Archibald Cox in Watergate-the Sword of Damocles 15 ' hangs over the special prosecutor's
head, thus creating two adverse consequences. First, such a placement of power jeopardizes the de facto independence of the special
prosecutor. Second, it inevitably shatters the public perception of independence with respect to the investigation. This is particularly true
143. See H.R Doc. No. 94-550 (1976) (setting forth President Ford's proposal of special
prosecutor legislation).
144. See supra notes 94-101 (discussing the rise and fall of this proposed bill).
145. H.R. Doc. No. 94-550, at 2.
146. Id.
147. For a discussion of the separation-of-powers issues related to the independent
counsel law, see Gormley, supra note 16, at 615-17.
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a discussion of the Appointments Clause
problems that plagued the independent counsel law, see Gormley, supra note 16, at 613.
149. For a discussion of the removal issues related to the independent counsel law, see
Gormley, supra note 16, at 614-15.
150. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text (describing Lloyd Cutler's and President Gerald Ford's proposals for an "executive branch appointment" model). Senator
Orrin Hatch recently considered the benefits of allowing the president to appoint special
prosecutors as a means of maintaining presidential authority and accountability in The
Independent Counsel Statute and Questions About Its Future,62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145,
155, 158-60 (1999).
151. The "Sword of Damocles" refers to a legend in which Damocles, a friend of King
Dionysius, was invited to a banquet. The invitation came after Damocles had wished for
Dionysius's power and wealth. While seated at the banquet, Damocles discovered a sword
dangling precariously above his head to serve as a message that with great power and
wealth comes imminent danger. THE BOOK OF VIRTUES 213-15 (William J. Bennett ed.,
1993).
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if the president himself (as in Watergate or the Lewinsky scandal) is
the subject of the investigation. The last thing in the world that engenders public confidence in the system is having the president pick
the prosecutor and control his own investigation.
An offshoot of the "presidential appointment" proposal is a
model that requires the attorney general to propose a "roster" of suitable special prosecutor candidates at the start of a president's term.
The attorney general's list then would be supplied to the special
three-judge panel as the need arose, so that a selection could be made
by the judicial branch. ProfessorJohn Q. Barrett, a former prosecutor
who worked with Lawrence Walsh on the Iran-Contra matter, has advanced this proposal. 1 52 Statutorily vesting the attorney general with
the power to create a "short-list" of acceptable candidates for the position has some allure. It diminishes the scent of politics, yet keeps the
attorney general in the loop, so that she can have a say in appointments within her own Justice Department. But who controls the investigations once the appointment is made? Professor Barrett's proposal,
which was advanced before Congress declined to renew the independent counsel law, allowed the special three-judge panel to oversee the
independent counsel's operation, albeit in a limited fashion. 153 But
Congress-as the Senate hearings made clear-has no present intention to re-establish a Special Court as an overseer of the special
prosecutor.' 5 4
Moreover, any plan that envisions the president (or the attorney
general) identifying a pool of acceptable special prosecutors in advance and saving them for a rainy day seems hopelessly impractical.
Few talented lawyers of the caliber one seeks to recruit for such sensitive investigations-involving the most powerful elected officials in
the land-would wish to volunteer for a case without knowing all of

152. See Hearingson the Futureof the Independent CounselAct, supra note 26, at 283-86 (testimony ofJohn Q. Barrett, Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University, and former Associate Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra investigation).
153. SeeJohn Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51
ADMIN. L. REv. 631, 647-48 (1999) (stating that the Special Division threeludge panel must
respect and preserve the attorney general's jurisdictional request and that the statutory
provision allowing the Special Division to expand the independent counsel's jurisdiction
against the attorney general's objections must be eliminated); see also Hearings on the Future
of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 287 (prepared statement of John Q. Barrett)
(suggesting changes to the Independent Counsel Act "that reduce [the Special Division's]
role to ministerial tasks, such as appointing qualified Independent Counsel").
154. See, e.g., Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 484
(remarks of Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman) (recognizing that "several provisions ... that
apply to the three-judge panel ... really have been rendered ineffective or a nullity or not
practical and ... are not really a part of the operative law").
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the specifics. The idea that a team of nationally recognized attorneys
would sit on the bench like all-star football players, waiting to be
called onto the field for the "big game," is highly dubious. Few busy
lawyers-particularly lawyers in the business of handling nationally visible criminal cases-would agree in advance to make such a commitment. At best, they would reply: "I'll think about it when the time
comes-when I know the specifics."
There is no substitute for selecting a special prosecutor for a particular investigation as the specific case arises. Although developing a
mechanism by which the attorney general (rather than the president)
can create a neutral, qualified list of potential candidates is a proposal
that bears further exploring,15 5 any rigid effort to appoint "specialprosecutors-in-waiting" at the start of a president's term is both impractical and nonproductive.
D. Returning to the Old System of Ad Hoc Appointments
In the aftermath of the Lewinsky scandal, the most powerful momentum for change has been in the direction of the system that existed prior to the 1978 enactment of the special prosecutor law.
Democrats and Republicans alike have linked hands, weary of battle
and dissension, in support of a return to the ad hoc method of appointing special prosecutors by the attorney general.
Former Senators Robert Dole and George Mitchell, joined by an
impressive list of lawyers and public servants, produced a twenty-threepage report for the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings
Institution in May 1999 (on the eve of the expiration of the independent counsel law), advocating a return to the pre-Watergate approach.' 5 6 The Dole-Mitchell Report recommended that Congress
enact legislation requiring the attorney general to issue standing regulations that would govern the appointment and functioning of special
prosecutors to ensure their independence and guard against
abuses.15 7 Other than mandating such internal regulations, however,
155. Such a proposal is, in fact, discussed later in this Article. See infra note 218 and
accompanying text.
156. DOLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51. Other distinguished members of the drafting
committee included Zoei Baird, Drew S. Days, III, Carla Anderson Hills, Bill Paxon,John G.
Roberts, Jr., David E. Skaggs, Dick Thornburgh, and Mark H. Tuohey III. Id. at unnumbered page following cover page. Other scholars have supported this view as well. See, e.g.,
Katy J. Harriger, Can the Independent Counsel Statute Be Saved?, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs.
131, 141-43 (1999) (endorsing a return to the ad hoc method of appointment used prior
to 1978); infra notes 158-167 and accompanying text (discussing the agreement among
many witnesses that there should be a return to the ad hoc system).
157. DoLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51, at vii, 9-14.
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the system of yore by which the attorney general maintained control
and responsibility for special prosecutor investigations would be
reinstituted.
During the course of the Senate hearings, witness after witness
extolled the virtues of returning to the ad hoc system.1 5 Former Attorney General Griffin Bell-who successfully appointed his own special prosecutors during the Carter administration when charges arose
concerning alleged money laundering by the Carter Peanut Warehouse and other sensitive matters-told senators that the previous system had operated smoothly. 159 "The government works well," Bell
concluded, "if it is left alone."1 6 ° Joseph diGenova-former Independent Counsel in the Bill Clinton passport file investigation during the
Bush administration, and later a vocal critic of the special prosecutor
law-told the Senate Committee members: "The body politic has
caught the cure and has died.... My position is a very simple one,
that you should end it, not mend it."161 Robert S. Bennett-who defended Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during the Iran-Contra investigation and later represented President Clinton in the Paula
Jones matter-underwent an "epiphany" after observing the statute in
operation. 162 A former supporter of independent counsel legislation,
Bennett confessed to the senators that he had now concluded that the
statute was irreversibly flawed. 163 In Bennett's opinion, it had been
158. See, e.g., Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 203
(testimony of Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Davis, Polk and Wardwell) ("In terms of my views as to
the statute, I believe that in the vast majority of situations it would be far preferable to
allow the career prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office and in the Justice Department to
investigate and prosecute these cases."); id.at 245 (testimony of Attorney General Janet
Reno). Reno explained:
[W]e have come to believe that the country would best be served by a return to
the system that existed before the Independent Counsel Act, when the Justice
Department took responsibility for all but the most exceptional of cases against
high-ranking public officials and when the Attorney General exercised the authority to appoint a special prosecutor in exceptional situations.
Id.
159. Id. at 30 (testimony of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, former U.S. Attorney General).
160. Id at 39.
161. Id. at 56 (testimony ofJoseph E. diGenova, Independent Counsel, Clinton Passport
File Investigation).
162. See id. at 144-48 (testimony of Robert S. Bennett, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
and Flom). Realizing that the statute should not be reenacted, Bennett testified that at an
earlier time he supported the Independent Counsel Act and that he had "felt that it was
necessary for public acceptability to have such a statute." Id at 144. The "epiphany" characterization was made by fellow witnessJoseph E. diGenova in relation to the sudden awakening of several former supporters of the Independent Counsel Act regarding the statute's
shortcomings. Id.at 84-85 (testimony of Joseph E. diGenova).
163. See id.at 144-48 (testimony of Robert S. Bennett).
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turned into a "nuclear weapon" in the arsenal of partisan politics, inciting scandals and destroying the public's respect for government at
every level.1 64 Bennett stated: "In the passion that followed the Watergate scandal, it seems that the country and Congress may have ignored the most obvious lesson of Watergate. The system worked."16' 5
Attorney General Janet Reno and Whitewater Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr, who had developed a frayed working relationship after the Lewinsky matter boiled into a national disaster, at least
agreed on one simple proposition following their mutually exhausting
experience: It was best to return to the old system.' 66 A weary Kenneth Starr told the Committee:
I think it is fair to say that the Act has been a worthwhile
experiment. It has yielded significant results. The results, I
believe, support this conclusion: Jurisdiction and authority
over these sensitive matters ought to be returned to the Justice Department. And who16 7will oversee them? The Congress, the press, the public.
In its unadorned form, however, the ad hoc method of yesteryear
is not the magical key to eliminating the problems of the past. All of
the reasons that militated in favor of creating a special prosecutor statute in the first place percolate to the surface once we return to a system that places unfettered control over special prosecutors in the
hands of the attorney general. First, and most obviously, the Saturday
Night Massacre dilemma comes roaring back. Because the attorney
general answers to the president in the chain of command, either of
those top executive officials can effectively abort an independent
counsel investigation with the snap of two fingers by terminating the
special prosecutor at will. 6 ' This problem does not disappear in the
ad hoc system.
Second, returning such sensitive and critical investigations to the
Justice Department with no strings attached does little to bolster public confidence in the investigations. Restoring faith in the system, after all, was a primary concern driving Congress's decision to hash out
164. Id. at 145, 149.
165. Id at 148.
166. See id. at 245 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno) (stating that "the country
would best be served by a return to the system that existed before the Independent Counsel Act"); id. at 425 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel) (advocating a
return of investigatory authority to the Justice Department).
167. Id. at 425 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr).
168. See id. at 421 (discussing the problems inherent in leaving special prosecutor appointments within the executive branch).
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special prosecutor legislation after Watergate.16 9 Public trust in government had bottomed OUt.1 70 It may be true that Attorney General
Griffin Bell's ad hoc delegation of the Carter Peanut Warehouse investigation worked well (so well that the special prosecutor "accounted

for every peanut and every nickel"), 17' but that was a relatively benign
matter that never boiled to a head and never transmogrified itself into
a national crisis or a political deathmatch. Would the public's confidence in Griffin Bell's approach have been as unvarnished in Watergate or in the Lewinsky scandal, when the allegations of presidential
wrongdoing mushroomed (in a wholly unpredictable fashion) into
ugly national scandals that ultimately wrecked the nation's trust in
government? Allowing the attorney general to appoint special prosecutors works nicely when it comes to those run-of-the-mill scandals
that constitute an inevitable part of political and governmental life. It
does not work so well, however, in those rare instances that scandalsfor reasons that can never be understood or anticipated in advancemetamorphose themselves into crises that test the foundations of our
democratic republic.
Third, the American public has grown comfortable with special
prosecutors. They have been a part of the political-legal culture of the
United States for over twenty years.17 2 As Senator Fred Thompson
noted, despite his personal distaste for the statute, there is some wisdom in the argument "that we can't go back again; that now that we
have it, the public expects some kind of other mechanism even
though it may be flawed; and that we are not really writing on a blank
slate anymore in terms of public perception. "17' There have been
over twenty independent counsels appointed over the twenty-two-year
life span of the statute. 17 ' Despite the criticism of specific investigations (which is often driven by political orientation), the American
169. See Special ProsecutorHearings,supra note 5, at 61 (remarks of Hon. William L. Hungate, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary) ("The need for restoring public confidence in Government has never been greater.
The urgency for action has never been more immediate.").
170. See HARmGER, supra note 35, at 44-46 (detailing survey results regarding the decline
in public opinion over the course of the Watergate scandal).
171. Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 30 (testimony of
Hon. Griffin B. Bell, former U.S. Attorney General) (referring to the work of Independent
Counsel Paul Curran).
172. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 641-42 (discussing the number and proliferation of
independent counsel investigations since the statute's adoption in 1978).
173. Hearingson the Future of the Independent CounselAct, supranote 26, at 170 (remarks of
Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman). But see HARRIGER, supra note 35, at 195-96 (asserting
that the public does not have much confidence in the independent counsel approach).
174. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 641-42 n.166 (listing twenty independent counsel
investigations and their subjects).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:97

public has grown accustomed to the notion of appointing neutral
prosecutors from outside the Justice Department in special cases.
Ever since Watergate, special prosecutors have become an accepted
part of our criminal justice machinery.
Fourth, the death of the Watergate-era special prosecutor statute
will not eliminate the need for some sort of law. In future years, when
a scandal erupts at the highest levels of the executive branch, who will
investigate such allegations? What rules will govern? When the
Watergate scandal reached crisis proportions, Attorney General-Designate Elliot Richardson and Special Prosecutor-Designate Archibald
Cox scribbled out ideas on hotel napkins to create a makeshift set of
rules to govern a fast-moving criminal investigation.1 75 With the help
of a hodgepodge of senators and staffers, Cox and Richardson ground
out an impromptu charter governing the special prosecutor and established parameters that both parties could respect and the public
could trust.176 One of the primary reasons for enacting a special pros-

ecutor law after the shock of Watergate was to eliminate this haphazard approach to launching special prosecutor investigations when
177
serious crises arose in the future.
Fifth, the standard argument in favor of returning to an ad hoc
system is misleading at best and flawed at worst. It was summed up by
Attorney General Reno, a convert to the anti-special-prosecutor-law
position, in this fashion: "Perhaps the real lesson of our Nation's experience with the special prosecutor during Watergate is not that the old
system was broken, but that it worked."17 A parade of notable witnesses who appeared before the Senate Committee, including former
Attorney General Griffin Bell, Kenneth Starr, and others, seconded
that sentiment. 179 Their arguments generally followed this path of
175. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 376 (prepared
statement of Kenneth G. Gormley, Professor of Law, Duquesne University).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 246 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
179. See id. at 29 (testimony of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, former Attorney General) ("It lasted
for about 200 years and nothing terrible ever happened in the country."); id. at 425 (testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel) (recalling Winston Churchill and stating that "[r]eturning authority over these prosecutions to Attorneys General, and relying
on them to appoint outside counsel when necessary, is the worst system, except for all the
others"); id. at 148 (testimony of Robert S. Bennett, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and
Flom) ("In the passion that followed the Watergate scandal, it seems that the country and
Congress may have ignored the most obvious lesson of Watergate. The system worked.");
id. at 57 (testimony of Joseph E. diGenova, Independent Counsel, Clinton Passport File
Investigation) ("The system that we have in existence for investigating crime and prosecuting it is a good one. It has held us in good stead over many years, when we have had
problems at the Executive Branch.").
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logic: During Watergate, Attorney General Elliot Richardson appointed his own special prosecutor, Archibald Cox; President Richard
Nixon attempted to thwart the criminal justice system by firing Cox;
the American public and Congress rose up and unleashed a firestorm
of protest, forcing Nixon to appoint a new special prosecutor (Leon
Jaworski) who ultimately completed the Watergate investigation and
drove Nixon out of office; the American democratic system survived,
protected by the web of checks and balances, and by the effective
force of political pressure, public pressure, and a vigilant news media.18 ° The system worked.
What this convenient reconstruction of history overlooks, however, is how close President Nixon came to successfully aborting the
Watergate investigation and wreaking havoc on the American constitutional system. Henry Ruth, Cox's deputy who later served as Watergate Special Prosecutor, jolted the Committee by reminding the
assembled senators: "As one who was in charge during the Saturday
Night Massacre, it is impossible to describe how thin a thread existed
at that time, and for 3 weeks thereafter, for the continuation of the
Special Prosecutor."18
Challenging those senators who suggested
that Watergate had validated the old ad hoc system, Ruth stated:
[T] o say that you want to set up a system that can survive a
Saturday Night Massacre, to me, is inviting a Saturday Night
Massacre because in this age of PR, I believe, as current
events have proved, a very strong information machine at the
White House
can create the atmosphere for a massacre to
18 2
succeed.
Sam Dash, who served as Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate
Committee, similarly reminded Senator Thompson's Committee that:
[Watergate] is not a lesson to follow. Because President
Nixon was not about to appoint a new Special Prosecutor.
He thought the investigation was over and . . . [it was the]
publicity that the Senate Watergate Committee gave out that
summer [that] so outraged the American people that they,
180. See, e.g., id at 148 (testimony of Robert S. Bennett) ("The practical reality is that
there could never be a cover-up of a serious crime by a President or other high-ranking
official."); id at 57 (testimony of Joseph E. diGenova) ("Long before the existence of this
statute, Attorneys General and Presidents were forced to appoint outside counsel to investigate crimes when there were obvious political conflicts of interest because the public wheel
required it. Congress and journalists demanded it, and there was a reaction to the elected
officials in the Presidency and in the Executive Branch that they had to respond.").
181. Id. at 194 (testimony of Henry Ruth, former Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special
Prosecution Force).
182. Id.
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in millions of protests, forced the hand of the President to
83

1
appoint one.

Dash concluded: "We cannot rely on that happening again."1 " 4
Although this history is generally overlooked, Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox came very close to succumbing to pressure from the
White House-in order to avoid a constitutional show-down-and
abandoning his demand for the White House tape recordings that ultimately proved Nixon's complicity in the Watergate coverup. 18 5 On
the eve of the Saturday Night Massacre, President Nixon came within
a hair of pulling off the so-called "Stennis Compromise" that would
18 6
have kept the damning tapes out of the special prosecutor's hands.
President Nixon failed to shut down the Watergate investigation only
because of Cox's strength of character, the fact that there were few
major college football games televised on the day of Cox's final press
conference (allowing the American public to tune in), 18 7 and other
twists of fate.
Indeed, one strong current that swirled beneath the 1999 Senate
hearings was how often the government had succeeded in exerting
pressure to delay or derail potentially damaging criminal prosecutions
at moments of intense governmental stress. Without some mechanism in place to distance the attorney general from certain sensitive
investigations that involve the executive branch, dangerous, silent
conflicts often play tricks on the system. This is true even where men
and women of impeccable credentials and high-minded intentions are
involved. George Beall, who served as U.S. Attorney in Maryland and
handled the investigation of Vice President Spiro Agnew for accepting
kickbacks as governor of that state, recounted uncomfortable experiences in which Attorney General John Mitchell and his Justice Department attempted to sidetrack prosecutions involving high
183. Id. at 388-89 (testimony of Samuel Dash, former Chief Counsel to the Senate
Watergate Committee and former Ethics Advisor to Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr).
184. Id at 389.
185. GoRtmLE, supra note 1, at 346-47.
186. For a detailed discussion of these events, see GoRaI.EY, supra note 1, at 323-31.
President Nixon proposed that Senator John Stennis of Mississippi would review the nine
subpoenaed tapes with nonpertinent portions deleted. Id at 325-26. Senator Stennis
would reword portions of the tapes that could be embarrassing to the President while
deleting portions that posed a national security threat. Id at 326. The tapes, as edited by
Senator Stennis, would be turned over to Archibald Cox in compliance with the subpoena.

Id
187. See id at 348 (recounting the decision by NBC and CBS to air the press conference
and ABC's commitment to broadcast college football).
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government officials.1 8 Henry Ruth, the Watergate prosecutor who
was hired two decades later to investigate the U.S. Government's disastrous raid on a religious cult complex in Waco, Texas, called the initial FBI and Justice Department report on that matter a
"whitewash."189
When moments of crisis and scandal strike, even good systems
populated by honorable officials break down. The whole point of
constructing detailed special prosecutor legislation was to create a failsafe system-a system that would kick into operation in rare circumstances to prevent a constitutional meltdown. Although a return to
the former ad hoc system does resolve the separation-of-powers, Appointments Clause, and removal problems that plagued the now-defunct independent counsel law, it does not resolve a different set of
issues. When the next crisis strikes, what rules, procedures, or statutory schemes will be in place to handle it? Will Congress be forced to
scramble to reinvent a special prosecutor law twenty years from now
when the next scandal involving the president, the vice president, or
the attorney general explodes onto the front page of newspapers and
media Web sites, starding a complacent nation?
Rather than throwing away twenty-three-years-worth of experience with special prosecutor investigations in the United States (some
investigations are still proceeding forward under the statute based
upon the "grandfather" provision),"' the more productive course is
to determine what mechanism should be constructed in its place now
that the pulse of the Watergate-era law has stopped beating. A careful
distillation of the wisdom contained in the Senate hearings provides
useful clues that can be turned into productive answers.
III.

A

MINIMALIST REPLACEMENT FOR THE EXPIRED INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL LAW

Assuming that Congress is not inclined to overhaul the now-defunct independent counsel statute in order to cure its deficiencies, the
next most sensible course for Congress to follow is to create a sturdy
replacement structure. Even stripped to its bare bones, a successful
188. Hearings on the Future of the Independent CounselAct, supra note 26, at 210 (testimony
of George Beall, Hogan and Hartson).
189. Id. at 211 (testimony of Henry Ruth, former Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special
Prosecution Force).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (allowing the statute to remain in force "with respect to
then pending matters before an independent counsel that in thejudgment of such counsel
require such continuation until that independent counsel determines such matters have
been completed").
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plan for enabling special prosecutor investigations must do three
things: It must ensure some basic level of independence for whomever
undertakes the prosecution; it must ensure accountability to an extant
branch of government; and it must restore a modicum of public trust
in investigations that are targeted at high-level executive officials.
Even under such a minimalist approach, it is impossible to achieve any
baseline of success without some mechanism in place to prevent haphazard and chaotic investigations that have the ability to spiral into
national disasters.
Senator Fred Thompson was correct in observing that the inherent tug-of-war between accountability and independence makes the
creation of workable special prosecutor laws a complex feat in the existing tripartite system of American government. 9 1 What the 1999
Senate hearings made clear is that Congress, after ample soul-searching, has reached this conclusion: In the vast run of cases, accountability must come first. Under the American constitutional system, the
executive power is vested in the president, as the chief executive, and
in those officials (including the attorney general) charged with enforcing the laws.' 9 2 As a chorus of voices reiterated throughout the
Senate hearings, the chain of command for criminal investigations
must, as a general rule, lead back to the attorney general, and, ultimately, to the president.19 3 Special prosecutors who are accountable
191. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 413-14 (remarks of Sen. Fred Thompson, Chairman).
192. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
193. See, e.g., Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 330
(testimony of Lawrence E. Walsh, former Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation)
(stating that the power to control criminal investigations must ultimately remain in the
executive branch); id. at 291-92 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard University, and former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, and former Watergate Special Prosecutor) (supporting the notion of an assistant
attorney general in charge of special prosecutions, which would keep the chain of command within the executive branch); id. at 245, 247 (testimony of Attorney General Janet
Reno) (advocating a return of investigatory power to the Justice Department). Attorney
General Reno explained:
Our Founders set up three branches of government-a Congress that would
make the laws, an executive that would enforce them, and ajudiciary that would
decide when they had been broken. The Attorney General, who is appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, is publicly accountable for her
decisions.
...The ultimate issue is responsibility. I go back to the point that I made
that the system as it exists now diffuses responsibility, divides responsibility, and
fragments accountability. If I am going to get blamed for it, I would like to be
responsible for it and have the tools to do the job.
Id. at 245, 247.
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to no one are unhealthy for all concerned. Any useful replacement
for the expired independent counsel statute, therefore, must first
come to grips with this legislative consensus: A special prosecutor who
is accountable to no one is worse than no special prosecutor at all.
The best solution therefore lies in a two-tiered approach. "Tier
19 4
one" would resemble the plan set forth in the Dole-Mitchell Report,
as well as the approach advocated by former Attorney General Griffin
Bell.1 9 5 Under this expansive first tier, the attorney general would
possess a wide amount of discretion in handling allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch. In the large run of cases involving
allegations of criminal misconduct by officials within the executive
branch, we would return to the former ad hoc system.1 96 The attorney
general would decide whether the appointment of a special prosecutor was warranted. 197 The attorney general would decide who should
be appointed for a specific investigation. 9 8 The attorney general
would be responsible for that investigation, would monitor it, and
would make the decision whether an investigation (or an individual
prosecutor) should be terminated. 9
Yet this does not mean that our nation should, or can afford to,
return to the haphazard approach that existed prior to Watergate.
The first step, as the Dole-Mitchell Report concluded and as a number
of Senate witnesses agreed, is for the attorney general to establish
clear internal Justice Department regulations that set forth concrete
procedures for selecting, supervising, and terminating special prose194. DoLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51.
195. See Bell et aL, supra note 34, at 464-65 (statement of Judge Griffin B. Bell). Judge
Bell stresses the amount of skill and expertise available within the Department ofJustice as
a primary argument for allowing the Justice Department to handle investigations into and
prosecutions of executive officials. Allowing the independent counsel statute to expire, he
argues, would eliminate an impediment to the Department's task of prosecuting and
would provide room "to trust our institutions and hold our institutions accountable." Id. at
465; see also Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 31 (prepared statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, former U.S. Attorney General) ("The Department
ofJustice is perfectly adequate to handle any investigation; particularly if we hold the Attorney General and the Department of Justice to a standard of being a neutral zone in the
government.").
196. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 653-59 (proposing a return to ad hoc decisionmaking
under certain circumstances); see also DoLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 11 (stating that
when dealing with the appointment of a special prosecutor, "there is no substitute for the
Attorney General's sound exercise of prosecutorial judgment on a case by case basis").
197. See DoLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 11-12; Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 29-30 (testimony of Hon. Griffin B. Bell).
198. See DoLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 11-12; Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 29-30 (testimony of Hon. Griffin B. Bell).
199. See DOLE & MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 12-21 (setting forth several suggestions for
internal regulations and parameters guiding a special counsel's investigation).
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cutors. 20 0 There must be a meticulous set of rules, constructed in ad-

vance, that survive the transition from one attorney general (and one
administration) to another. As ProfessorJulie O'Sullivan pointed out
during her characteristically thoughtful Senate testimony, internal
regulations that ensure genuine independence for special prosecutors
will go a long way to blunt public skepticism and partisan finger-pointing.2 1 It is true, as Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut noted,
that the existing regulatory procedures in place at the Justice Department are loose and allow the attorney general too much discretion in
deciding critical matters such as hiring special prosecutors.20 2 Yet
there is plenty of rich foundation material for creating up-to-date Justice Department regulations. Twenty-three-years-worth of experience
under the independent counsel statute can be put to good use; sensible provisions contained in that legislation can be grafted directly into
the Justice Department procedures. If done carefully, this transfer
can create a solid basis for ad hoc appointments of special prosecutors
in the future.2 "3 Creating a first-rate set of procedures must therefore
be an immediate priority of the new attorney general in the year 2001.
In the bulk of cases-which would include matters such as the
controversial Espy prosecution, the investigation of HUD Secretary
Henry Cisneros, and other investigations that are viewed as examples
of wasteful expenditures of time and resources under the independent counsel law2 04 -the attorney general would follow her own regulations in determining whether an inquiry was warranted. In many
such instances, assigning the case to a particular U.S. Attorney or Justice Department prosecutor with unassailable credentials and special
expertise for the particular investigation might be enough to ensure

200. See id. at 9-21 (stating the need for such guidelines and proposing recommendations for regulations).
201. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 365-66 (testimony ofJulie Rose O'Sullivan, former Assistant Prosecutor of the Whitewater Investigation
and Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center).
202. See id. at 258 (remarks.of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) ("I believe that the current regulations give the Attorney General total discretion regarding the appointment of special
counsels .... ").
203. At present, the DOJ regulations in place constitute a somewhat outdated, "cobbled
together," incomplete collection of bits and pieces of past versions of the independent
counsel law. Id. at 401 (testimony ofJulie Rose O'Sullivan). They do not incorporate the
experiences of the past five years, in which glaring problems and omissions were identified
in the statute. The Justice Department has indicated that it is working diligently at bringing the existing procedures up to date. Id. at 258-60 (testimony of Attorney General Janet
Reno) (discussing proposed revisions to the current Justice Department regulations).
204. For a discussion of these and other investigations, see Gormley, supra note 16, at
653-59.
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autonomy and eliminate any serious risk of public mistrust in the
20 5
matter.
In the event that the attorney general did find herself faced with
an actual or potential conflict of interest, however, the Common
Cause model would provide a useful method for insulating her from
the investigation, while at the same time leaving the matter within the
umbrella of the Justice Department. 20 6 If the attorney general determined that an actual or potential conflict existed, the regulations
would require her to delegate responsibility-including the decision
whether to appoint a special prosecutor in the first place-to the assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division. 20 7 This official would be in a position to construct a sturdy "firewall" around the
investigation, and thus could keep the attorney general at arm's
length, so the integrity of the Justice Department (and the criminal
investigation) would not be jeopardized. Such a firewall would only
be necessary, however, when an actual or potential conflict existed.
The first tier-shoring up the procedures for ad hoc appointments-is a good start. But it is not enough. A second tier must be
created to provide a release valve in the event that pressure on the
system becomes so intense that it threatens to damage one branch or
multiple branches of government. Under any plan that returns control of special prosecutors to the Justice Department, there must be a
fail-safe mechanism in order to deal with the most serious, potentially
destructive crises at the very top of the executive pyramid. A reasonable amount of public mistrust in politics is healthy; an extreme
amount, generated by a scandal like Watergate or the Lewinsky matter, can damage a democratic republic for years. As Senator Joseph

205. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 295 (testimony of Charles G. La Bella, former Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task
Force) (discussing the enormous prosecutorial talent available to the attorney general
within the federal system); Gormley, supra note 16, at 654-55 (recognizing the ability and
two-hundred-year history within the nation's criminal justice system for dealing with investigations of executive officials). Within the Justice Department, there are unique pockets
of expertise. The Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department, for instance, is populated by many experienced lawyers who span both Democratic and Republican administrations and are unassailable in terms of their neutrality. See Hearings on the Future of the
Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 280 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
206. See supra notes 103-140 and accompanying text (discussing the Common Cause
model).
207. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 322-24 (prepared statement of Common Cause) (proposing the adoption of regulations similar to
those in place during the tenure of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, which charged the
assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division with reviewing all
prosecutorial decisions and protected against undue influence from high-ranking executive officials).
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Liebeiman noted after the Lewinsky investigation and failed impeachment: "I know cynicism has been part of American history, but the
cynicism quotient [now] seems to be a bit higher and expresses itself
in distrust of government."2" 8
Congress should therefore combine the Dole-Mitchell approach
with legislation providing that when there is substantial evidence that
a felony has been committed by the president, vice president, or attorney general, a back-up mechanism will be triggered. In such unusual
cases, it is virtually impossible for the attorney general, or even an
assistant attorney general, to make a determination that is free from
bias, the appearance of bias, or the taint of conflicted loyalties. If such
a situation bubbles to a head in a way that threatens the stability of our
governmental system-as in Teapot Dome, Watergate, and, most recently, the Lewinsky scandal-there needs to be a mechanism in place
that citizens, public officials, and targets of investigations can all trust.
As Independent Counsel Curtis von Kann, who handled the Eli Segal
"Americorps" investigation, told the 1999 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: "I believe there is great value in having already in
place an established mechanism and procedures for dealing with
those exceptional situations where the public would not likely accept
the integrity of a Department of Justice decision to prosecute, or not
20 9
to prosecute, officials at the highest level.
The answer, as we have learned from the experience of the past
few years, does not lie in wresting authority away from the Justice Department and vesting it in a three-judge panel that has no power or
ability to take action. In hindsight, the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison v. Olson,2 1 ° which upheld the independent counsel law, simultaneously doomed it to failure. By insisting that the three-judge
panel could possess no supervisory power over the independent counsel, but rather could only appoint and rubber-stamp periodic reports
of the independent counsel, 21 1 the Supreme Court, in effect, created
a prosecutor with no home base within our tripartite system of government. Not only was the prosecutor distanced from the executive
branch, but he or she was also insulated from the legislative and judicial branches. Congress could do nothing but review perfunctory re-

208. Id. at 175 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Lieberman).
209. Id. at 76 (testimony of Hon. Curtis Emery von Kann, Independent Counsel, Eli
Segal Investigation, Americorps Chief).
210. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
211. See id at 680-85.
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ports and issue periodic paychecks.2 1 2 The three-judge panel could
not engage in more than superficial interaction with the special prosecutor for fear of pushing the statute over the separation-of-powers
precipice. Morrison's stern tone clearly guided the Special Court in its
timorous vision of itself. As Presiding Judge David Sentelle of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals informed the Senate Committee:
"We do not oversee the Independent Counsel. We appoint the Independent Counsel-if we supervised, we would cross the line of the
separation of powers, and I do not think the Supreme Court in Morrison would have upheld a statute that allowed for that."2 1 Judge Sentelle's former colleague on the Special Court, Judge John D. Butzner,
Jr., put it in even more stark terms. In an academic forum, Judge
Butzner opined that once it appointed a special prosecutor, the Special Court's job was "[v]ery little, and less than that."21' 4
Perhaps the reading of the Constitution set forth in Morrisonwas
both inevitable and correct. Perhaps it was inescapable that federal
appellate judges would be particularly ill-suited to run criminal investigations. But it took ten years to discover that this reading also disemboweled the statute. When Congress crafted the independent counsel
law in the 1970s, it absolutely did not envision that the special prosecutor would be accountable to no person or entity.2 5 Rightly or
wrongly, Congress envisioned that the three-judge panel would serve
as a surrogate for the attorney general and would perform the role
that Elliot Richardson had performed during Watergate-interacting
with the special prosecutor and keeping the investigation on track.2 16
An unaccountable special prosecutor was the last thing that Congress
intended to create. As the statute evolved in the years after Morrison,
however, that is precisely what emerged.
The solution, therefore, is to begin by separating the appointive
function from the supervisory function. Much of the game can be
won-with minimal cost to the governmental system-simply by creating a set of ground rules that maximizes public trust in the appoint212. See 28 U.S.C. § 595 (a) (2) (1994) (setting forth the duty of an independent counsel
to "submit to the Congress annually a report on the activities of the independent counsel,
including a description of the progress of any investigation or prosecution").
213. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 476 (testimony
of Hon. David B. Sentelle, PresidingJudge of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals).
214. Fourth Circuit Conference, supra note 33, at 1541 (remarks ofJohn D. Butzner, Jr.,
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Member, Special Panel for
Appointments of Independent Counsel).
215. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 678-80 (discussing Congress's intent in creating the
independent counsel statute).
216. Id at 678.
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ment process. Where substantialevidence exists that a felony has been
committed by the president, vice president, or attorney general, Con2 17
gress should mandate the triggering of the "tier-two" mechanism.
In such cases, a special prosecutor must be appointed in a fashion that
violates neither the separation-of-powers doctrine nor the public trust.
All three branches of government should leave their imprint on the
selection process, thereby eliminating any serious future assertions
that the appointment was biased or rigged.
Once the tier-two mechanism is triggered, the attorney general
(in consultation with the president, if those two officials deem it appropriate) would recommend three suitable appointees.2 1 8 A special
panel of federal judges-selected randomly for this limited purposewould be given the statutory duty to select one of the recommended
candidates.21 9 This selection would occur only after the panel considered background information concerning each individual as well as
written input from the attorney general. 220 If the special panel determined that none of the three names the attorney general supplied was
suitable for the particular investigation at hand, the panel would request a fresh batch of names and would begin the process anew.
Once a special prosecutor-designee was selected by the special
panel ofjudges, the judicial branch's involvement would be complete.
217. This is similar to the approach advocated in a report published by the Miller
Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, which is co-chaired by Griffin B. Bell
and Howard H. Baker, Jr. See MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERs: THE ROLES OF INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, INSPECTORS GENERAL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND

EXECUTRVE ORDERS (final report) (1998). The Miller Center Report recommended that
Congress enact a statute requiring that when the president, vice president, or attorney
general was the subject of a serious criminal investigation, the attorney general must recuse
herself. Id. at 4. She would then be required to appoint an outside special prosecutor or a
Justice Department official who was not disqualified. Id The attorney general would still
maintain the power to remove the special prosecutor for good cause. Id.
218. Cf Barrett, supra note 153, at 647-48. Professor Barrett suggests that the attorney
general create an annual roster of approximately fifteen experienced prosecutors to be
considered for any investigations that may arise. See id.; Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 285 (testimony of John Q. Barrett, Assistant Professor of
Law, St. John's University, and former Associate Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation); see also Bell et al., supra note 34, at 477-78 (remarks of Lloyd Cutler, Senior Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering) (suggesting that the president nominate, with advice and
consent of the Senate, five or ten individuals to serve as independent counsel candidates).
As suggested in Part II.C, this author believes that it is preferable to select a small number
of candidates for a specific investigation.
219. Professor John Barrett has proposed a "Lotto" system by which chiefjudges from
the federal circuits would be randomly chosen to select a recommended candidate. Barrett, supra note 153, at 647.
220. See id. at 647-48 (suggesting that the attorney general provide a list of experienced
candidates each year); Gormley, supra note 16, at 685-86 (identifying the need to ensure
that the attorney general has input in the selection process where appropriate).
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The designee would face confirmation by the United States Senate-a
process similar to that which took place when Archibald Cox and,
practically speaking, Leon Jaworski were appointed during Watergate. 22 1 The Senate would be free to conduct hearings, just as it does
222
whenever an executive branch appointee requires confirmation.
This would ensure that the special prosecutor-designee was both fit
for the job and sufficiently neutral. The Senate confirmation would
also caution against improvident removal by the president or his alter
egos.

22 3

If the above approach were followed, one of the central goals of
the original post-Watergate special prosecutor law-maximizing a
sense of trust in the process by citizens and elected officials of both
be neatly accomplished. The attorney general
parties 224-would
would remain actively involved in the selection process, thus eliminating separation-of-powers concerns. 2 25 At the same time, a neutral entity-the special panel of federal judges-would be injected for the
limited purpose of ensuring objectivity and detachment in making the
final selection from the attorney general's list.226 Although we have
learned that special courts are ill-suited to run special prosecutor investigations, 2 27 allowing judges to perform this limited appointive

221. See JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAw: THE BATrLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS
Cox AND JAwoRsKi 234-46 (1977) (detailing the selection and introduction of Leon Jaworski as Cox's replacement). Leon Jaworski, who succeeded Cox, was not technically confirmed by the Senate. Rather, bowing to intense pressure from Congress, the White House
agreed to appoint Jaworski. Id. at 234 (indicating that the missing tapes raised the urgent
need for Acting Attorney General Robert Bork to identify a special prosecutor to replace
Cox). Robert Bork appointed the new special prosecutor. Id. at 234-37. Pursuant to Jaworski's extremely protective charter, he could not be removed "'except for extraordinary
improprieties' and then only after the President consulted the Majority and Minority leaders of Congress as well as the ranking members of the two Judiciary Committees to determine 'that their consensus is in accord with his proposed actions.'" KUTLER, supra note 84,
at 427. Thus, Congress was very much involved in the entire process.
222. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (granting the Senate confirmation powers over
executive appointments).
223. For a thoughtful discussion of the value of the Senate confirmation process, see
Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counse4, 86 GEo. L.J. 2133, 2149-51
(1998).
224. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's desire after
Watergate to renew public confidence in American government).
225. See Gormley, supra note 16, at 685-86 (discussing the attorney general's proposed
involvement in the selection process).
226. See id. at 686 (stating that "[ulltimately, the special court must (and will) decide
whom to appoint as independent counsel, unconstrained by political shackles").
227. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 484-85
(testimony of Hon. David B. Sentelle, Presiding Judge of the Special Division of the Court
of Appeals) (discussing the Special Division's lack of supervisory power over independent
counsel investigations and the unconstitutionality of any sort of judicial oversight); supra
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function still makes good sense. The public wants to feel assured that
the deck is not stacked against the investigators or the investigated.
Elected officials, particularly those of the same political party as the
target, want strong assurances that the investigation will not turn into
a political assassination. All those concerned want a ready-made guarantee, from the inception of the investigation, that politics is not
poisoning the decision-making with respect to this unique, politicallysensitive criminal inquiry. The judicial branch is the only branch of
government in the federal system that is removed, in fact and in structure, from the unruly fray of politics. Leaving the ultimate power of
selection to a neutral panel of federal judges creates a sense of confidence that the appointment was not "fixed," getting the investigative
process off to a good start.
Moreover, because the attorney general would have proposed the
designee-rather than leaving the matter to the random whim of the
threejudge panel-and because the Senate would have tested that individual through rigorous confirmation hearings, there could be no
serious question about the neutrality of the final selection. All three
branches of government, under this new tier-two approach, would
have added their touch to the critical appointment stage. From this
springboard, a fair and balanced special prosecutor investigation
could be launched.
Supervisory power over the special prosecutor, pursuant to tiertwo investigations, would remain squarely in the hands of the attorney
general. The same internal procedures that governed tier-one special
prosecutors would govern tier-two special prosecutors. 228 The attorney general and the special prosecutor would use their collective good
judgment to determine-based upon the nature of the investigation,
notes 211-215 and accompanying text (exploring the problem of the independent counsel
as "a prosecutor with no home base within our tripartite system of government").
228. Under the expired independent counsel law, the special prosecutor was required
to follow internal Justice Department procedures. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994). However,
those procedures, heretofore, have been loose and incomplete. Attorney General Reno
herself admitted that there were "major loopholes" in the Justice Department procedures
with respect to special prosecutors. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act,
supra note 26, at 275 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno). The expired statute,
which required an independent counsel to follow these policies except where not possible,
created an open-ended exception allowing an independent counsel to side-step the Department ofJustice procedures. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1); Hearingson the Futureof the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 274 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(agreeing with Senator Durbin that the independent counsel statute "provides that [an
independent counsel] shall follow the policies of the [Justice] Department, except where
inconsistent with the purposes of this Act. And that creates a significant exception that is
subject to considerable interpretation."). Such loopholes, as a first order of business,
would have to be closed.
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the identity of the target, and so on-the appropriate amount of interaction between their two offices. One of the great failures of the
independent counsel law-and of many investigations carried out
under that statute as it evolved, including the Monica Lewinsky matter-was the almost compulsive effort by the Office of the Independent Counsel and the attorney general to stay away from each other.
This distancing was presumably based upon a fear that any interaction
might create an appearance of collusion and monkey-business. Perhaps that was an understandable concern. But it led independent
counsels to increasingly build solid walls between themselves and the
Justice Department. 29 And it led the Justice Department to seal those
walls with impenetrable mortar.
In drafting the independent counsel legislation, the original plan
was never to alienate the attorney general and special prosecutor from
one another. It is true that there had to exist a sufficiently opaque
dividing wall between the two, so that the investigation would remain
uncompromised. But this did not mean that the attorney general and
the special prosecutor were meant to look the other way when they
saw each other in the halls of the Justice Department. Archibald Cox
and Attorney General Elliot Richardson dealt with each other regularly during the darkest days of Watergate.2 3° Although Richardson
pledged to the Senate that Cox would remain independent, the two
officials interacted freely, whenever necessary to keep the investigation on its proper track.2 31 The two met in Richardson's private fifthfloor Justice Department office to discuss the limits of Cox's jurisdiction; to discuss sensitive issues concerning the granting of immunity to

229. One danger in allowing independent counsels to build walls around themselves
involves their ability to expand the jurisdiction of their investigation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 593(b) (3) (authorizing an independent counsel "to fully investigate and prosecute the
subject matter with respect to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment
of the independent counsel, and all matters related to that subject matter" (emphasis added)).
Even if the attorney general does not grant the independent counsel's request as set forth
under 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (2) (B), the jurisdiction may still be expanded by way of a court
determination that the issue is "related" to the matter originally under investigation.
Gormley, supra note 16, at 666 & n.268 (discussing judicial expansion of the independent
counsel's jurisdiction).
230. See GoRmLE, supra note 1, at 294-99, 318-20. During Watergate there was a growing
skepticism by White House officials toward Cox's investigation, and the "relationship of
mutual trust between Cox and Richardson grew and wrapped them like ivy tighter together." Id. at 299.
231. See id. at 241-45 (detailing the concern held by members of the Senate regarding
Richardson's reluctance to give Cox the independence needed to fully investigate the
Watergate scandal). The relationship, of course, had some limits. See, e.g., id. at 237-38
(describing the agreement between Cox and Richardson that Special Prosecutor Cox
would not share all of the details of the investigation).
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witnesses when national security might be implicated; to wrangle over
a host of matters, big and small, whenever the White House complained to Richardson that the special prosecutor was "off the reservation." 232 The two men kept a respectful distance when it came to the
confidential inner-workings of the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force's operation, 23 3 but they found room for responsible
interaction.2 3 4
When Congress enacted the original special prosecutor law after
the Watergate experience, it was not only attempting to create a statute that would produce another Archibald Cox-a special prosecutor
of unassailable character and integrity 2 3 5-but it was also seeking to
bottle and preserve his unique relationship with the Justice Department. Although many overlook this fact, "the other element of the
2 36
successful Watergate formula was Attorney General Richardson."
Attorney General Richardson was a key ingredient in the proper functioning of the system. He acted as a skilled go-between in the struggle
between the White House and the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force,2 3 7 and he ultimately stood behind Cox when the President directed that Cox be fired. 238 This is a model worth replicating and
preserving. Whether a special prosecutor is appointed through the ad
hoc method or through a tier-two mandatory appointment, there is
room for cautious yet professional interaction with the official running the Justice Department. The special prosecutor himself or herself is in a position to make sensible judgments concerning what the
attorney general should hear and not hear, know and not know, based
upon the specific facts of the investigation. As Professor Barrett has
aptly stated:

232. Id. at 296. Richardson sought to maintain the lines of communication and pass on
to Cox complaints from the White House. See id. at 297-99.
233. See id. at 297-99 (explaining that while keeping a cordial relationship with Cox,
Richardson remained loyal to the President's position).
234. See id.at 318-22. The task Richardson and Cox faced was similar to navigating a
minefield with "the sands of Watergate blowing fiercely in their eyes." Id. at 320.
235. See id. at 234-36 (explaining Cox's merits, as discussed during the special prosecutor selection process); id. at 346-52 (describing the tense moments leading to and including the press conference at which Cox announced he would not accept the President's
forced compromise regarding the White House tapes).
236. John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing or Maybe Cooperation:Attorney General Power, Conduct,
andJudgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519, 545
(1998).
237. See supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson's relationship with the White House and with Cox).
238. See GoRMLEa, supra note 1, at 345-46 (outlining Richardson's reasons for resigning
upon Cox's dismissal).
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The scope and quality of this relationship would be in the
discretion of the independent counsel. Some independent
counsel will never "hit it off' with some Attorneys General
because of who they are (for example, a close colleague of
the independent counsel's subject), because of what and
where they have been both professionally and personally,
and because of other facts that may be unique to an investigation. But other independent counsel may try to develop a
pattern of contacts and a level of trust in Attorneys General,
especially if it becomes better understood that the independent counsel has the upper or only hand with regard to the
conduct of his investigation.23 9
A system premised upon creating a kryptonite wall between the
attorney general and the special prosecutor is both undesirable and
unhealthy. Special prosecutors, if their investigations are to proceed
smoothly, need the help and support of the Justice Department, with
whom they must act in synchronization. The Justice Department
needs to develop a positive working relationship with special prosecutors so that their investigations stay on course without damaging the
criminal justice system they are both sworn to protect.
Admittedly, under the two-tiered scheme set forth above, the Saturday Night Massacre dilemma does not vanish. Whether the attorney
general appoints a special prosecutor pursuant to her own initiative
(tier one), or whether the attorney general is statutorily mandated to
appoint a special prosecutor (tier two), nothing will stop the attorney
general from firing the special prosecutor if she decides to issue that
command. Indeed, nothing can physically compel the attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor even in the most egregious circumstances-that is, even where the statutory threshold is patently
24
met-if she is hell-bent on defying Congress. 0

239. Barrett, supra note 236, at 545.
240. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, during the course of the 1999 Senate hearings, repeatedly sought to probe witnesses to determine whether there was some constitutional fashion by which Congress could ask a federal court to mandamus an attorney
general to appoint a special prosecutor if she refused to do so. See Hearings on the Futureof
the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 95-96, 396-97 (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(questioning Hon. Curtis Emery von Kann, Joseph diGenova, Samuel Dash, Julie
O'Sullivan, and Ken Gormley). Witness after witness concluded that, in the final analysis,
there was no way (consistent with the separation of powers doctrine) for Congress to hold
a gun to the head of the attorney general and force her to initiate a criminal proceeding if
she did not believe that the statutory threshold had been met and refused to take such
action. See id. at 95 (testimony of Hon. Curtis Emery von Kann, Independent Counsel, Eli
Segal Investigation, Americorps Chief); id. at 96 (testimony of Joseph E. diGenova, Independent Counsel, Clinton Passport File Investigation); id at 397-98 (testimony of Julie
Rose O'Sullivan, former Assistant Prosecutor of the Whitewater Investigation and Professor
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But this fly in the ointment is unavoidable if Congress wishes to
return special prosecutor investigations back to the hands of the executive branch, which seems to be, at least at present, the overwhelming
legislative consensus. At the same time, the chances of revolt by an
attorney general, as a practical matter, would be greatly diminished by
the creation of a careful set of internal regulations guiding the appointment (and dismissal) of tier-one special prosecutors. They
would also be diminished by a statutory command that she appoint
(and stand behind) a special prosecutor in circumstances that fall
under tier two. Moreover, a provision requiring "good cause" to terminate a special prosecutor-under either tier-would reduce the
chance of mischief.24 Although an attorney general bent on defying
Congress and the American public could technically accomplish that
goal, he or she would take such action at her own (and at the president's) peril.2 4 2
CONCLUSION:

A

Two-TIERED SYSTEM THAT BENEFITS ALL PARTIES

The unsatisfying Lewinsky scandal and the bloody battle over the
Clinton impeachment taught us a number of things. One was that a
special prosecutor law that eliminates accountability to our tripartite
system of government is a disaster for all concerned. The independent counsel statute, as originally conceived in the post-Watergate
years, envisioned that the three-judge panel would monitor special
prosecutor investigations and keep them on track.24 3 Rightly or
wrongly, once Morrison v. Olson made it clear that all meaningful judicial supervision was impermissible,2 44 the special prosecutor became a
creature without a home base. Not only did lack of accountability
lead to charges that the Office of Independent Counsel had run
of Law at Georgetown University Law Center); id. (testimony of Kenneth G. Gormley, Professor of Law, Duquesne University); id. at 311-13 (letter from Jon P. Jennings, Acting
Assistant Attorney General).
241. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1) (1994) (providing that the attorney general can only remove an independent counsel for "good cause").
242. Witnesses before the Senate Committee argued against a mandamus provision in
an independent counsel statute because Congress may instead rely on political pressure to
encourage the attorney general to initiate an investigation. See Hearingson the Future of the
Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 97 (testimony of Joseph E. diGenova) (discussing
the tools of the advise and consent process, the appropriations process, and the
reauthorization process as helpful in encouraging the appointment of special prosecutors); id. 95 (testimony of Hon. Curtis Emery von Kann) (asserting the value of public
outcry in forcing the appointment of a special prosecutor).
243. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's early expectations and practical experiences involving the role of the three-judge panel in shaping
special prosecutor investigations).
244. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-85.
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amok, but it also intensified friction between the Justice Department
and the special prosecutor, causing the beleaguered Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr to complain "that a statutory Independent
Counsel is out there alone," with no real back-up from the Justice
2 45
Department.
We have learned from recent accounts concerning the Starr investigation that Attorney General Reno's staff and Independent Counsel Starr's staff reached a point of near-contempt for each other by the
time the Lewinsky scandal was in full bloom. The recent book on the
Clinton scandals authored by veteran reporters Susan Schmidt and
Michael Weisskopf demonstrates that the relationship between the
two offices-on the eve of Starr's testimony before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the impeachment of President Clintonhad become frayed and dysfunctional.2 4 6 Starr himself, during the
course of his Senate testimony, openly and bitterly referred to the lack
of support that his office received from the Justice Department, stating that this damaged his ability to perform his job properly. 24 7 Starr
told the Senate Committee: "I think it is a matter of public record we
were not met with full cooperation in this investigation. "24 In a re
cent article in the George Mason Law Review, adapted from his first
speech after leaving the Office of Independent Counsel, Starr further
commented:
The Attorney General-speaking generically-had no incentive to support an independent counsel. In fact, the structure created exactly the opposite-incentives to stand in the
way, incentives to injure and, above all, incentives to sit neutrally on the sidelines when the independent counsel, and
from the
even career prosecutors who were on assignment
249
Justice Department, came under assault.
Rather than working as a team to pursue an investigation and
perhaps bring it to a mutually satisfactory conclusion, the Attorney
General's office and Starr's office drifted into opposing camps like

245. Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 465 (testimony
of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel).
246. SCHMIDT & WEISSKOPF, supra note 28, at 262-67.
247. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 424, 431-32,
443-44, 465 (testimony and prepared statement of Kenneth W. Starr).
248. Id at 465.
249. Kenneth W. Starr, Lessons Learned From the Recent Past, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 349,
350 (1999). This article was adapted from a speech Starr delivered at a luncheon hosted
by the Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce on November 4, 1999, shortly after he left
the Office of Independent Counsel. Id at 349 n.*.
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two pugilists in contrary corners.25 ° If there had been an ongoing
relationship between the two offices, regular dialogue between Starr
and Reno, and a clear chain of command that gave Attorney General
Reno responsibility for the special prosecutor's actions, is it possible
that the Lewinsky investigation would have followed a different path?
Is it possible that Attorney General Reno would have appointed a different independent counsel to handle the Lewinsky matter when she
realized that Kenneth Starr (by virtue of his Whitewater baggage) was
perceived by a large segment of the American public as biased against
the President? Even if Starr had been authorized to expand into this
new matter-largely unrelated to his Whitewater charter-is it possible that Attorney General Reno would have put the brakes on the
Lewinsky investigation if she had concluded that Starr's staff was acting in an unduly aggressive manner? Would regular meetings between Reno and Starr (of the sort Archibald Cox and Elliot
Richardson engaged in), during which Reno voiced her concerns and
suggested alternative approaches in the Lewinsky matter, have given
the investigation a softer edge? If Attorney General Reno had directly
participated in the selection of the Whitewater special prosecutor in
the first place, rather than having the three-judge panel trump her
selection of Robert Fiske and replace him with Starr, would she have
stood behind her appointee when the investigation came under political attack? Would she have worked more closely with the special prosecutor to smooth out conflicts with the White House in order to
salvage the trust and respect of the American public?
In the end, the now-defunct independent counsel statute proved
harmful to all concerned-the attorney general, the special prosecutor, and the target of the investigation. The special prosecutor drifted
around with no connection to, support from, or restraint by any
branch of government. The two-tiered approach set forth above, although a minimalist replacement for the once grandiose independent
counsel law, would at least cure that glaring defect. The attorney general would remain firmly in charge of the overwhelming bulk of special prosecutor investigations. Internal Justice Department
regulations would exist to govern ad hoc appointments of special
prosecutors. 251 Only in rare and serious circumstances-where substantial evidence was brought to light suggesting that the president,
250. See supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text (discussing the tense relationship
between the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and the Attorney General's

Office).
251. See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of Justice
Department guidelines to be used in "tier-one" appointments of special prosecutors).

2001]

WHAT CONGRESS CAN SALVAGE FROM THE WRECKAGE

147

vice president, or attorney general had committed a felony-would a
statutory mechanism be triggered that mandated the appointment of
a suitable special prosecutor, selected with the blessing of all three
branches of government.252 Even in such rare situations, this prosecutor would still have room to interact with and be accountable to the
attorney general. The attorney general would also still have ultimate
authority to reign in (and if necessary terminate) a special prosecutor.
Another Saturday Night Massacre, in theory, could still occur. But at
least a fail-safe mechanism would be in place to minimize the chance
of runaway scandals and to head off constitutional crises.
In the end, neither guns, nor mandamus actions, 25 3 nor any
other form of compulsion can force an attorney general to appoint a
suitable special prosecutor if she is determined to resist it. 2 54 But in
moments of crisis, creating an orderly set of rules that the attorney
general must follow is vastly superior to creating no set of rules at all.
The two-tiered approach set forth above, building a fall-back position
atop the usual ad hoc method of appointing special prosecutors, provides a positive statutory boost for all concerned. First, it assists the
attorney general. It gives her statutory cover if she is being pressured
by the White House to take inappropriate positions with respect to
investigations in which the president or vice president is directly implicated. 25 5 It gives the attorney general an easy statutory justification for
2 56
making the decision to punt to a special prosecutor.
More importantly, the two-tiered approach provides a statutory
box into which the attorney general can be cornered if she resists the
ad hoc appointment of a special prosecutor. Congress, the American
public, and the ever-watchful news media can apply enormous pressure on the attorney general, if a matter like Watergate or the Lewinsky scandal reaches crisis proportions, forcing her to follow the
statutory command. Rather than being left with a system that vests
unlimited discretion in an individual presidential appointee in extreme circumstances, the availability of a tier-two investigation would
252. See supra notes 208, 217-223 and accompanying text (detailing the need for a guaranteed method of investigating the highest ranking executive branch officials for alleged
misconduct and suggesting the two-tiered approach).
253. See supra note 240 (discussing Senator Specter's inquiry into the constitutionality of
mandamus to force an unwilling attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor).
254. See supra notes 240-242 and accompanying text (addressing the lack of compelling
authority to force an attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor).
255. See supra notes 217-223 and accompanying text (presenting a mechanism that
removes an investigation of the president, vice president, or attorney general to a special
prosecutor outside the Justice Department).
256. See Hearings on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra note 26, at 329 (testimony of Lawrence E. Walsh, former Independent Counsel, Iran-Contra Investigation).
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provide a corner into which to nudge a reluctant or compromised
attorney general.2 5 7
Finally, the two-tiered approach would actually provide a form of
protection for a special prosecutor by establishing a three-branch consensus with respect to his or her selection, backed by strict Justice Department procedures that limit the circumstances under which he or
she could be dismissed. It would also provide more incentive for the
attorney general and the special prosecutor to interact in a productive
fashion, and for the attorney general to stand behind a special prosecutor (whom she helped select) when that neutral official came under
fire.
Shakespeare's Marc Antony once observed that: "[t]he evil that
men do lives after them; [t]he good is oft interred with their
bones." 2 8 In its death, the independent counsel law has shone a light
on at least one path that can help ensure that scandals and crises do
not sap the strength, vitality, and sense of public confidence out of
our American democratic republic. Congress's challenge is to learn
from, and build upon, the experiences of the past twenty-three years.
It must not allow itself to purge those experiences, however unpleasant, from its memory.
Otherwise, future generations of citizens will simply have to face
the adverse consequences the next time a crippling scandal strikes the
executive branch, at some unexpected moment in American history.

257. See supra note 242 (identifying the political and other pressures that can be brought
to bear upon a defiant attorney general).
258. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,JuuuS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2. This analogy was previously made
by Nathan Lewin. Hearingson the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, supra, note 26, at 155
(testimony of Nathan Lewin, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca, and Lewin).

